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ARTICLES
Towards a New Eviction Jurisprudence
Gerald S. Dickinson*
ABSTRACT

The One-Strike Rule, contemplated in a model lease provision, has been the
primary mechanism employed by Congress to eliminate the "scourge of drugs"
in public housing projects. The rule gives public housing authorities (PHA)
discretion to evict tenants engaged in drug-relatedcriminal activity and hold the
tenant equally liable if a guest orfamily member engaged in the criminal activity,
even if the tenant had no knowledge of the offense. The Supreme Court most
notably upheld this policy in 2002 in United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker.
Today the wisdom of that rule, which has served as the foundationfor PHAs'
eviction policies, has come under attack by recent court decisions in
Pennsylvania and North Carolina. In Housing Authority of Pittsburgh v.
Somerville, the trial court disrupted the normal state of affairs by denying the
eviction of a young, unemployed, single woman, expecting her first child,
notwithstanding a prior drug-related conviction, holding that eviction would
result in a "serious injustice." While in Eastern Carolina Regional Housing
Authority v. Lofton, a state appellate court found that the eviction of a single
mother and her three young children, all innocent bystanders to drug-related
criminal activity, would be excessive and shockingly unjust and that eviction
would produce an "unconscionable" result.
This Article engages in a normative interpretation of the statutes the courts
in Pennsylvania and North Carolina relied upon in denying the eviction of poor
tenants, specifically 35 P.S.§ 780-157(b) of the PennsylvaniaExpedited Eviction
of Drug Traffickers Act and § 42-26(a)(2) of the North Carolina General
Statutes. The statutes implicitly attack Rucker by authorizing trial courts to deny
Law Clerk for the Honorable Theodore A. McKee, Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit (Philadelphia). Prior to clerking, the author was an attorney at Reed Smith
LLP (Pittsburgh) where he founded and coordinated the finn's Housing Rights Project, a pro bono
initiative advocating on behalf of indigent tenants facing eviction in the Pittsburgh area. The author is
also a former Fulbright Scholar to South Africa, where he conducted a comprehensive project on
housing, evictions and urban development alongside faculty at the University of the Witwatersrand
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the eviction of the tenant if the courts are convinced the eviction would result in
serious injustices or unconscionable consequences, thus running afoul of the
post-Rucker normal state of affairs. This Article argues that the Pennsylvania
and North Carolina eviction statutes, and the recent rulings relying on the
serious injustice exemption and unconscionability rule, serve as the foundation
for what I coin a "new eviction jurisprudence" that gives special consideration
to the constitutionalprotections of property afforded to groups most vulnerable
to the One-Strike Rule: households headed by poor women with children.
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INTRODUCTION

Until today, the One-Strike Rule was the in statu quo res erant ante bellum,'

the normal state of affairs for a public housing authority (PHA) to effectuate a
drug-related eviction. The process to evict was quite simple. A PHA would learn
of a drug-related incident on or near the premises of a subsidized unit. The PHA
would investigate the incident to determine whether the culprit was the
leaseholder, a guest, or a family member. Upon gathering the relevant
information, the PHA would swiftly apply the One-Strike Rule by serving a

notice to quit to effectively start an eviction proceeding to remove the tenant and
household members, even if the tenant was not the offending party, had no
knowledge of the criminal activity, nor foresaw the activity. 2 The rule, drafted in
a model lease provision, authorized PHAs to impose a strict-liability eviction

policy on the grounds of, among other things, drug-related activity. Eviction
resulted in the termination of the tenant's housing benefits and in some
circumstances led to temporary or permanent homelessness.
Congress, quixotically, convinced itself that a strict-liability One-Strike Rule
mandated in a model lease provision inscribed under federal regulations would
restore public safety by protecting tenants from the "reign of terror"3 of drugs in
public housing projects. The Supreme Court most notably upheld the One-Strike
Rule in United States Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,
holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) entrusted the decision to evict a tenant to
PHAs-which the Court said were in the best position to determine the extent of
drugs in a public housing project-and that "no fault" evictions were appropriate
where a PHA deemed it necessary.4
1. In Latin, in statu quo res erant ante bellum means "in the state in which things were before the

war."
2. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (1990)); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, §
504, 104 Stat. 4079, 4185 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5) (1990)); Housing Opportunity Program

Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5) (1990)).
3. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002). The premise of
this "no-fault" eviction policy is that public housing residents deserve a safe and secure place to live. In
1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, under 42 U.S.C. § 1437, in an effort to address the
concern of drug dealers' "reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income housing
tenants." The Act, later amended, stated that, "[P]ublic housing agency shall utilize leases which ...
provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
premises by other tenants or any drug related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a
public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the
tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Id. Indeed, this Act and the applicable federal
regulations requiring public housing leases to have terms authorizing the eviction of tenants for drugrelated criminal activity was the central issue in the United States Supreme Court ruling inRucker.
4. See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130. The Court explained its reasoning most vividly when discussing the
public policy consequences that public housing authorities faced with the perceived influx of drug-related
crime: "The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease provision. Instead,
it entrusts that decision to the local public housing authorities who are in the best position to take account
of, among other things, the degree to which the housing project suffers from 'rampant drug-related or
violent crime' (citation omitted) the 'seriousness of the offending action' (citation omitted) and 'the
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Many PHAs have, as a result of the ruling, complied with the One-Strike
policy as the solution to drug-related crime in the projects.5 Today, some PHAs
appear to be embarking upon a policy strategy of zero tolerance, nonsensically
believing that each eviction will rid the projects of drugs, or delude taxpayers
into thinking federal and state agencies have control over the War on Drugs in
public housing. Nonetheless, the hope, presumably, is that the problem will
simply cease to exist-until, of course, the next non-resident drug offender, who
operates within an entrenched system of institutionalized poverty that contributes
to mass incarceration of the poor, returns to the public housing complex for the
next fix or big deal.6 Like the War on Drugs, excessive abuse and overenforcement of a strict-liability rule by some PHAs, unsurprisingly, has failed to
deter the growth and scourge of drugs in public housing projects.7 The irony is
that public housing projects were purposely built "bleak, sterile, cheapexpressive of patronizing condescension" in locations that contributed to the
"ghettoization" of cities8 that have been the target of the War on Drugs for
decades. 9
extent to which the leaseholder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending
action.' . . . It is not 'absurd' that a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who had no
knowledge of the drug-related activity. Such 'no-fault' eviction is a common incident of tenant
responsibility under the normal landlord-tenant law . . . (citation omitted). Strict liability maximizes
deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties." Id. at 133 34.
5. Shortly after the new "normal state of affairs" was established by the Supreme Court, Michael M.
Liu, Assistant Secretary for the United Department of Housing and Urban Development, published a
letter that called for caution and reasonableness from PHAs pursuing evictions on the grounds of drugrelated criminal activity. Liu wrote that " [ t]he Rucker decision upholds HUD regulations that, since 1991,
have made it clear both that the lease provision gives PHAs such authority and that PHAs are not
required to evict an entire household or, for that matter, anyone every time a violation of the lease
clause occurs. Therefore, after Rucker, PHAs remain free, as they deem appropriate, to consider a wide
range of factors in deciding whether, and whom, to evict as a consequence of such a lease violation.
Those factors include, among many other things, the seriousness of the violation, the effect that eviction
of the entire household would have on household members not involved in the criminal activity, and the
willingness of the head of household to remove the wrongdoing household member from the lease as a
condition for continued occupancy. The Secretary and I urge you to consider such factors and to balance
them against the competing policy interests that support the eviction of the entire household." See Letter
from Michael M. Liu, Assistant Secretary of HUD to Public Housing Directors (June 6, 2002),
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/regs/rucker6jun2002.pdf
6.

See generally

BRUCE

WESTERN,

PUNISHMENT

AND

INEQUALITY

IN

AMERICA

(2006)

(investigating the scope and consequences of growth in the America penal population and explaining
how prisons and jails in America have come to form part of social inequality and poverty); MICHELLE
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS

(2010)

(arguing that mass incarceration in the United States emerged as a comprehensive and well-disguised
system of racialized social control that functions in a manner similar to Jim Crow laws of the South).
7. See generally BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK
PROGRESS (2012) (exploring decades of penal expansion coupled with the concentration of incarceration
among blacks and illustrating the exclusionary effects of mass incarceration).
8. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 20
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1974) (discussing the magnitude of the effects of evictions in the aftermath of the
exercise of eminent domain to displace thousands of people to the urban periphery in New York).
9. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1115 16 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit
described the deteriorating environment of public housing projects in its decision: "Many of our nation's
poor live in public housing projects that, by many accounts, are little more than war zones. Innocent
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However, a new war is being waged in the post-Rucker era. Rucker's normal
state of affairs is under attack and faces formidable opposition in Pennsylvania
and North Carolina after recent court rulings denied subsidized evictions by
relying upon rare statutory provisions.
In Housing Authority of the City ofPittsburghv. Somerville,10 a Pennsylvania
trial court ruled in favor of the tenant, deciding that her eviction would lead to a
serious injustice, the prevention of which overrode the health and safety of the
other residents. After taking into consideration the circumstances of the criminal
activity and the condition of the tenant, the court was clearly convinced that the
eviction of a young, unemployed, single woman expecting her first child-on the
basis of a drug-related conviction that occurred two and a half years earlier and in
light of a record of adequate rehabilitation-would result in such an injustice.
The court also took into consideration after-discovered evidence that was

admitted into the record indicating that the tenant's Section 811 application had
been approved by a neutral arbitrator, notwithstanding her prior drug-related

conviction. In concluding the eviction would result in a serious injustice, the
court expressly invoked a little-known, but useful, statutory exemption under 35
P.S. § 780-157(b) of the Pennsylvania Expedited Evictions of Drug Traffickers
Act. 12 The exemption was drafted into the Act to provide alternative safety valves
upon which courts could rely to avoid unjust evictions. 13
In Eastern CarolinaRegional Housing Authority v. Lofton, a North Carolina
appellate court found that the eviction of a single mother and her three young
children, all innocent bystanders to drug-related criminal activity, would be
excessive and shockingly unjust, and that the landlord failed to establish that

tenants live barricaded behind doors, in fear of their safety . . . . What these tenants may not realize is
that, under existing policies of [HUD], they should add another fear to their list: becoming homeless if a
household member or guest engages in criminal drug activity on or off the tenant's property, even if the
tenant did not know or have any reason to know of such activity or took all reasonable steps to prevent
the activity ... " Id.
10. No. GD 14-7207, 2014 WL 7734105 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 8, 2014). The case was appealed by
the Plaintiff to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, but was later discontinued by the HACP after the
Defendant prematurely terminated her public housing lease upon finding alternative housing using a
Section 8 voucher and subsequently moved out. See Superior Court of Pennsylvania Notice of
Discontinuation, 55 WDA 2015 (Feb. 11, 2015).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f ) (2000). The Section 8 program provides subsidy assistance for eligible
recipients who may qualify for project-based housing or a voucher. The voucher is a portable, in-kind
subsidy that allows the recipient to traverse the private rental market and lease-up with participating
landlords. The project-based scheme is a subsidy that is attached to the physical apartment unit and does
not remain with the tenant if the tenant terminates the lease or if the tenant is evicted.
12. "If the grounds for a complete eviction have been established, the court shall order the eviction
of the tenant unless, having regard to the circumstances of the criminal activity and the condition of the
tenant, the court is clearly convinced that the immediate eviction or removal would effect a serious
injustice the prevention of which overrides the need to protect the rights, safety and health of the other
tenants and residents of the leased residential premises." 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-157(b) (West 2015)
(emphasis added).
13. See infra Part IV (discussing the legislative intent behind the drafting and enactment of the
statutory exemption under the Act).
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eviction would not produce an "unconscionable" result.14 The court relied on the
four-pronged Morris Test created by the North Carolina Supreme Court that
permits courts to consider whether an eviction would be unconscionable when
reviewing a summary ejectment under N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-26(a)(2). 5
Under § 42-26(a)(2), a tenant may be evicted when the tenant has "done or
omitted any act by which, according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has
ceased." North Carolina courts, however, "do not look with favor on lease
forfeitures"' 16 and require PHAs to comply with the requirements of § 4226(a)(2) in order to evict. 17 As a result, PHAs in North Carolina have been put in
a precarious position. According to the appellate court, an authority now risks
having a request for eviction on the grounds of drug-related criminal activity
denied if the PHA fails to prove more than mere criminal activity on or near the
premises. Instead, they must show the eviction does not lead to an
unconscionable result. Indeed, the decision is quite the anomaly"' and threatens
the sanctity of the strict-liability One-Strike Rule. At the time of writing, Lofton
awaits final judgment at the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The Somerville and Lofton decisions are novelties in the post-Rucker era
because the rulings rely on rarely invoked statutory provisions that do not
explicitly incite the "innocent tenant" defense, which was gutted by the Rucker
Court in 2002. The provisions, when juxtaposed, provide a rare glimpse of postRucker legislation offering tenants unique substantive statutory protections. 35
P.S. § 780-157(b) of the Pennsylvania Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers
Act states:
If the grounds for a complete eviction have been established, the
court shall order the eviction of the tenant unless, having regard
to the circumstances of the criminal activity and the condition of
the tenant, the court is clearly convinced that the immediate
eviction or removal would effect a serious injustice the
prevention of which overrides the need to protect the rights,

14. 767 S.E.2d 63 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
15. "Inorder to evict a tenant in North Carolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly
reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof
of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3)
that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing
the forfeiture is not unconscionable." Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996)
(citing Morris v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 223 (1967)).
16. Stanley v. Harvey, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988).
17. Lincoln Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. Kelly, 635 S.E.2d 434, 436 (2006); see also Fleming, 473
S.E.2d at 375.
18. At the time of writing of this Article, the case is pending review. E. Carolina Reg'l Hous. Auth.
v. Lofton, 772 S.E.2d 708 (June 10, 2015) (upon consideration of the petition filed on Jan. 20, 2015 by
Plaintiff in this matter, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review of the decision of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (2015)).
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safety and health of the other tenants and residents of the leased
residential premises. 19
The four-prong Morris test, applied by courts when reviewing evictions under
§42-26(a)(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes, states:
In order to evict a tenant in North Carolina, a landlord must
prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to
declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is
clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the
landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the
landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and
(4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not
20
unconscionable.
Under these statutory schemes, the innocent tenant defense, although not explicit,
is just one part of a carefully calibrated matrix of factors that trial courts are
authorized to consider when determining whether to permit an eviction of a
tenant. Indeed, the rulings in Pennsylvania and North Carolina, which give
substance to these statutes, provide new avenues for deciding subsidized eviction
cases humanely and fairly by incorporating principles of substantive statutory
fairness into the decision-making process.
What the recent rulings have done, in essence, is give tenants additional
layers of substantive protections by permitting courts to replace administrative
agencies' discretion with judicial discretion over subsidized evictions. This
departure upends the normal state of affairs, which has, since the Rucker
decision, positioned the One-Strike Rule as a strict-liability, no-fault policy that
favors a PHA's uncontested discretion, absent a finding of bad faith, capricious
acts, or abuse of discretion21 . This Article takes several steps to unpack and
reveal the potential for a new jurisprudence.
Part I surveys the sociological literature on how evictions have been a
primary cause of residential mobility and increased concentration of the urban
poor. This Part frames the problem of evictions from a sociological lens to better
understand the relationship between eviction and the plight of the urban poor.
Further, this Part links the root cause of social disadvantage for poor tenants with
the rise of third-party policing tactics, which has contributed to eviction and
resulted in increased residential mobility of the urban poor. The sociological
themes of eviction discussed in this Part, such as housing instability and material
19. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-157(b) (West 2015) (emphasis added).
20. Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996) (citing Morris v. Austraw, 269
N.C.218, 223 (1967).
21. See generally Robert Hornstein, LitigatingAround the Long Shadow of Departmentof Housing
and Urban Development v. Rucker: The Availability ofAbuse of Discretion and Implied Duty of Good
FaithAffirmative Defenses in PublicHousing CriminalActivityEvictions, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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hardship, serve as important social contexts behind developing the new eviction
jurisprudence proposed in this Article.
Part II analyzes the language of the One-Strike Rule enumerated under 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(1), which authorizes PHAs to evict for drug-related activity; and
the Rucker decision upholding PHAs' wide-ranging discretion, which
subsequently set off controversy and confusion as to the meaning of the federal
regulations and the proper exercise of PHAs' discretion to evict. Part III then
analyzes the issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1), and by extension the Rucker
decision, preempt state landlord-tenant laws that conflict with the purpose of the
federal regulation. Here, case law is pulled from throughout the United States
22
showing that state courts are relatively divided on the question of preemption.
Part IV focuses on two recent and important developments in eviction lawthe "unconscionability" rule and the "serious injustice" exemption-which serve
as the crux of this Article's argument. Until now, the provisions have sat
relatively dormant, rarely invoked and somewhat inconspicuous to many
practitioners and legal scholars. To shed light on the provisions, this Part first
introduces the Pennsylvania Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers Act and
unveils the legislature's intent to provide additional safeguards to protect tenants
from unfair and unjust evictions through the serious injustice exemption.
This Part then turns to North Carolina, where the state supreme court created
the Morris Four-Prong Test to review landlords' attempt to forfeit lease
agreements under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26(a)(2). The fourth prong of the test,
specifically, has recently caused considerable controversy because it appears to
require landlords to prove that the eviction would not result in unconscionable
consequences, i.e. prove a negative. Without any precedent to rely on, the North
Carolina courts, particularly in Lofton, are being asked to define a term that-like
the serious injustice exemption in Pennsylvania-is a subjective anomaly in
statutory interpretation. However, the unconscionability prong is nonetheless a
novel breakthrough in eviction law because it gives tenants, particularly innocent
tenants, an additional substantive layer of protection that runs afoul of the Rucker
decision, laying the groundwork for a potential new jurisprudence.
Part V unpacks the new eviction jurisprudence, arguing that the Pennsylvania
and North Carolina statutes, and the recent rulings giving effect to the statutes,
22. Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called Out at Home: The One Strike Eviction Policy and
Juvenile Court, 3 DUKE FORUM FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 114 (2011). Compare Hous. Auth. of Joliet
v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106, 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting Rucker requires overruling of precedent
where PHA had previously required tenant to have knowledge of criminal activity of household
member), and Long Branch Hous. Auth. v. Villano, 933 A.2d 607, 610 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(stating that New Jersey statute is preempted by federal law which allows the eviction of a tenant who
"knowingly harbors" someone who commits a drug offense), and Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh v. Fields,
816 A.2d 1099, 1099 (Pa. 2003) (per curium) (holding that Rucker requires the reversal of a judgment
refusing to evict a tenant on the grounds of lack of knowledge), with Hous. Auth. of Covington v. Turner,
295 S.W.3d 123, 127 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that where PHA lease specifically references state
law allowing a tenant to cure the breach, there is no preemption), and Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v.
Hats, 861 N.E.2d 179, 181 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2006) (holding that Rucker "does not provide a basis
for preempting or limiting this court's equity powers" to prevent the eviction of an innocent tenant).
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implicitly attack Rucker and the fundamental unfairness of the One-Strike Rule.

Here, the Article suggests the statutes are powerful assertions of substantive
rights and protections for subsidized tenants. Under each statute, equitable
considerations are confined within a matrix of substantive statutory deliberation,
affording fairness as one of many factors into the decision-making process.
Relying upon the concepts extracted from the sociological literature on

concentrated poverty and evictions, a jurisprudence may develop that adds
substance to the definitions of "serious injustice" and "unconscionability" and
gives context to the statutory defences. With these two cases, a body of work is
available as a basis for future advocacy and litigation. A "new eviction
jurisprudence" indeed.
It is far too early to tell the impact of these recent court rulings. However,
they serve as important foundations for a new eviction jurisprudence that may
level the playing field for indigent tenants in eviction proceedings; respond
adequately to the interests of the poor; and, over time, lead to an equitable and
substantial enhancement for the courts' role in protecting constitutional and
statutory property interests afforded to the most vulnerable populations in
subsidized housing: households headed by poor women with children.23
I. EVICTIONS AND THE PLIGHT OF THE URBAN POOR

A. Evicting the Poor
Plenty of scholarship has been published on evictions. However, most of the
scholarship focuses on the One-Strike Rule 24 or the importance of legal
23. The phrase "poor women with children" is used throughout this Article to encapsulate
households headed by mothers with children and households headed by grandmothers living with both
children and grandchildren. Although it is also frequent to have public housing households headed by
older children caring for elderly grandparents. This particular demographic is disproportionately
represented in public housing and is therefore, as argued throughout the Article, at increased risk of
eviction under the One-Strike Rule.
24. See, e.g., Jim Moye, Can't Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and Urban
Development's One Strike Eviction Policy Fails to Get Drugs Out ofAmerica's Projects, 23 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 275 (2003); Caroline Castle, You Call That a Strike-A Post-Rucker Examination ofEviction
from Public Housing Due to Drug-Related Criminal Activity of a Third Party, 37 GA. L. REV. 1435
(2002); Adam Hellegers, Reforming HUD's "One-Strike" Public Housing Evictions Through Tenant
Participation,90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 323 62 (1999); Michael A. Cavanagh & Jason Williams,
Low-Income Grandparentsas the Newest Draftees in the Government's War on Drugs: A Legal and
Rhetorical Analysis of Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 10 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y, 157 (2003); E.J. Hurst, 38 Rules, Regs, and Removal: State Law, Foreseeability,
and FairPlay in One Strike TerminationsFrom Federally-SubsidizedPublicHousing, 38 BRANDEIS L.J.
733 (1999); Amy Bowser, One Strike and You're out-or Are You: Rucker's Influence on FutureEviction
Proceedings for Section 8 and Public Housing, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 611 (2003); Alicia Werning

Truman, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should Be Warned Others Could Lose Public
Housing If They PleadGuilty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1753 (2003); Eliza Hirst, Housing Crisisfor Victims of
Domestic Violence: Disparate Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic
Violence, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 131 (2003); Renai Rodney, Am I my Aflother's Keeper-The
Case against the Use ofJuvenile Arrest Records in One-Strike PublicHousing Evictions, 98 NW. U. L.
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representation in eviction proceedings. 25 This Part refocuses eviction discourse
on recent sociological research to add a new dimension to the conversation. This
new dimension helps draw parallels between housing instability as a cause and
not just a result of concentrated urban poverty. By drawing out several themes
from the sociological literature, such as housing instability and material hardship,

REV. 739 (2003); John Ammann, Housing out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 309 (2000); Heidi
Cain Lee, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housingfor the Ex-Offender in the Twenty-First Century."
33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131 (2003); Peter Saghir, Home is Where the No-fault Eviction Is: The
Impact of the Drug War on Families in Public Housing, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 369 (2003); Barbara Mule,
Barbara Yavinsky & Michael Yavinsky, Saving One's Home: Collateral Consequences for Innocent
Family Members, 30 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 689 (2005); Ryan Johnson, Criminal and DrugRelated Evictions from Public Housing for the Activities of Third Parties, 1 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 49
(2000); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2005); Jeffrey Fagan et
al., Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 415 (2006); Myers Namie, Strict Liability Drug Policy Renders Innocent Tenants
Homeless: Departmentof Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 30 S.U. L. REV. 277 (2002); Paul
Stinson, Restoring Justice: How Congress Can Amend the One-Strike Laws in Federally-Subsidized
PublicHousing to Ensure Due Process,Avoid Inequity, and Combat Crime, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 435 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of Counsel: 20 Years of Representation
before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 627 (1992) (summarizing studies of
the effects of lawyers); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact ofLegal Counsel on Outcomesfor Poor Tenants
in New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 419
(2001) (finding tenants represented by attorneys had a 21.5% probability of having judgment issued
against them, whereas there was a 50.6% probability for unrepresented tenants); Chester Hartman &
David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 461 (2003)
(describing large number of tenants who move out after receiving an eviction notice from their landlord);
Laura Abel et al., Results from Three Surveys of Tenants Facing Eviction in New York City Housing
Courts, CENTER FOR HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS AT THE CUNY GRADUATE CENTER AND THE BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW (2007) (finding that out of 1,767 tenants in New York
City Housing Court who submitted information about legal representation, 76% did not have a lawyer);
Lawyers' Committee for Better Housing, No Time for Justice: A Study of Chicago ' Eviction Court,
Lawyers Committee for Better Housing (2003) at 4 (where out of 763 cases observed, only 4% had
attorneys and tenants were represented a mere 5% of the time); Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The
Need to Reorganize a Right to Counselfor Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988) (stating that "[m]any states have poor persons statutes that authorize the
appointment of counsel in civil matters for people who cannot afford the costs of prosecuting or
defending a proceeding."); Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counselfor Indigent Tenants in Eviction
Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527 (1991) (analyzing the housing issues that
the poor tenants encounter in New York and arguing for a right to counsel in housing proceedings);
Nelson Mock, Punishing the Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of
Third Parties,76 TEX. L. REV. 1495 (1997) (arguing that no-fault evictions seem to be inconsistent with
the policy justifications supporting strict liability in torts and criminal law); Paris Baldacci, Assuring
Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New
York City's Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 659 (2004) (proposing a "more
active, inquisitorial-based role for Housing Court judges" in eviction proceedings); Laura Abel,
Evidence-BasedAccess to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 295 (2009); Randy Gerchick, No Easy
Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord
Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1993) (noting that reform may be necessary to protect the interests of
"small landlords"); Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2003) (recommending a right to counsel in eviction cases on the basis, in part,
that shelter is basic to living).
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we can unpack what is useful and perhaps groundbreaking about the new eviction
jurisprudence proposed in this Article.
Until recently, evictions were one of the most understudied legal processes
that affect the urban poor's residential mobility. 26 Half of all households below
the poverty line relocated between 2005 and 2010.27 And even though we "still
know very little about evictions,, 28 a greater emphasis on the sociological aspects
of involuntary removal helps us to better understand "the root causes of social
disadvantage and the development of effective policy initiatives. 29 Indeed, the
fact is that "housing remains absolutely central to the lives of the poor."30
Housing, at one time, was central to government policy. Until the 1980s, the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) budget
was second only to the United States Department of Defense. 3 However, the
poverty debate during Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty left housing as a
secondary issue behind addressing the problems caused by deindustrialization
and chronic joblessness.3 2 As some sociologists have argued, research on housing
and poverty-two seemingly interrelated issues-is lagging behind the more
advanced fields that study inequality and the family, employment, welfare and
the criminal justice system.33 In fact, some sociologists believe that the poverty
debate has not fully appreciated "how housing dynamics are deeply implicated in
creating and deepening poverty in America., 3 4 The origin of today's affordable
housing crisis is arguably the soaring costs of housing, incomes of the poor
falling or flat-lining, and federal assistance inadequately responding to the
soaring housing costs and drop in household income. 35 Indeed, the burdens
associated with constrained housing supply among low-income households will
continue to rise. The result being an increase in the number
of households that
36
eviction.
to
related
instability
residential
acute
experience

26. Matthew Desmond, Disposable Ties and the Urban Poor, 117 AM. J. Soc. 28 (2012); Matthew
Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicingthe Urban Poor, Consequencesof Third-PartyPolicingfor InnerCity Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 118 (2013); Matthew Desmond, et al., Evicting Children, 92 SOC.
FORCES 303, 320 (2013).
27. DAVID K. IHRKE & CAROL S. FABER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2005
To 2010 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p20-567.pdf.
28. Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOC. 88, 90
(2013).
29. Id. at 120.
30. Matthew Desmond & Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, Eviction's Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and
Health, 94(1) SOC. FORCES 295, 296 (2015).
31. Id. at 295.
32. Id.
33. Mary Pattillo, Housing: Commodity versus Right, 39 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 509 (2013).
34. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 30, at 296.
35. Id. at 297.
36. Id. at 296. Desmond and Kimbro state that the "[m]edian monthly rent for vacant units in the
United States was $371 in 1990, $483 in 2000, and $633 in 2006 (all in current dollars) an overall
increase of 70 percent in 16 years" and that "from 2001 to 2010, median rents increased by roughly 21
percent in Midwestern and Western regions, by 26 percent in the South, and by fully 37.2 percent in the
Northeast. These advances far outpaced modest gains in median incomes, which in the 2000s rose by 6
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Sociologist Matthew Desmond has tipped the scale in the sociological debate
on the structural forces that lead to the urban poor's lack of decent housing and
residential mobility.3 7 Residential mobility, in other words, is the process of

moving from one neighborhood to another.3 8 Desmond and other sociologists set
out to redefine a new body of work "that records the causes, dynamics, and
consequences of forced removal from housing owing to the pedestrian workings
of the low-income housing market in disadvantaged, segregated
neighborhoods." '9 Desmond posits three structural forces that affect the
residential mobility of today's urban poor: neighborhood dissatisfaction,
gentrification, and slum clearance. 40 Three types of mobility among urban renters
include forced mobility (evictions), immobility (remaining in home over time)
41 As would be expected, forced
and unforced mobility (voluntary movement).
42
mobility is caused by financial insecurity.
Numerous studies show that residential mobility brings higher rates of
adolescent violence, poor school performance, psychological costs, and the loss
of neighborhood ties.43 It also places barriers around escaping disadvantaged
neighborhoods. 4 Desmond argues that structural explanations, in and of
percent for households headed by people with a ninth-grade education or less, 7.3 percent for those
headed by high school graduates, and 12 percent by those headed by college graduates." Id.
37. Matthew Desmond, Tipping the Scales in Housing Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://nyti.ms/RmnDkY. Desmond was recently recognized for his groundbreaking work on evictions by
being named a MacArthur Fellow. See Robin Pogrebin, MacArthur 'Genius Grant' Winnersfor 2015 Are
Announced, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com2015/O09/29/arts/macarthur-genius-grantwinners-for-20 15 -are-announced.html? r=O.
38. Id.
39. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 30, at 318.
40. See Desmond, supra note 28, at 89. Desmond notes "social scientists have amassed considerable
evidence that poor families exhibit high levels of residential mobility, moving, in most cases, from one
disadvantaged neighborhood to another." Earlier studies have also been conducted on this topic. See
XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY:

RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN

METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2005); KARYN R. LACY, BLUE CHIP BLACK: RACE, CLASS AND STATUS IN

THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (2007) (focusing on the impact of differences in residential location on
the construction of identity for middle-class African-Americans); ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT

(2012) (theorizing that
there is a social component to enduring neighborhood inequality in that people react to neighborhood
difference); Scott South & Kyle Crowder, EscapingDistressedNeighborhoods: Individual, Community,
andAlfetropolitanInfluences, 102 AM. J. OF SOC. 1040 84 (1997); Scott South & Kyle Crowder, Avenues
and Barriersto ResidentialMobility among Single Mothers, 60 J. MARRIAGE AND FAM. 866 77 (1998);
Robert Sampson & Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Selection and the Social Reproduction of
ConcentratedRacial Inequality, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 1 29 (2008).
41. Matthew Desmond et al., ForcedRelocation and Residential Instability among Urban Renters,
89.2 SOC. SERV. REV. 227, 230 (2015).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Robert Sampson & Patrick Sharkey, Destination Effects: Residential Mobility and
Trajectories of Adolescent Violence in a Stratified Metropolis, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 639 (2010); Shana
Pribesh & Douglas Downey, Why Are Residential and School Moves Associated with Poor School
Performance?, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 521 (1999); Shigehiro Oishi, The Psychology of Residential Afobility:
Implicationsfor the Self Social Relationships, and Well-Being, 5 PERS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 5 (2010); Robert
Sampson et al., Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM.
SOC. REV. 633 (1999).
44. See Desmond et al., supra note 26, at 303.
AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 20 30
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themselves, however, cannot fully explain the high levels of residential mobility
among the urban poor.45 Instead, he posits eviction as one of the lesser known,
but leading causes, of concentrated poverty, segregation and racial isolation.46
Eviction is, indeed, the "hidden housing problem.,47
Over two million Americans live in public housing with incomes far below
the federal poverty line,48 while the private rental market constitutes the bulk of
housing for the ghetto poor. 49 Desmond's research focuses on the latter group.
But both groups, arguably, are similarly at heightened risk of eviction and the
consequences associated with housing instability and material hardship. 'o
Desmond's research has narrowed the scope of attention on a population at

extreme risk of eviction-low-income urban mothers.5 ' Poor urban mothers who
were evicted experienced more material hardship, worse health problems and
were more likely to suffer from depression.5 2 Material hardship, for example, is

a measure of the lived experience of scarcity" and assesses mothers who
experienced hunger and sickness as a result of shortages, or lack of access, to

food or medical care. 53
The fallout from eviction can cause an abundance of collateral damage in the

long-term.54 Even at the outset, the events leading to eviction cause turmoil, such
as conflict with the landlord, multiple court appearances, looming uncertainty of

the outcome, and the stressful moments during physical removal (possessions

45. See Desmond, supra note 28, at 89.
46. Id.
47. Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 461 (2003) (describing large number of tenants who move out after receiving an eviction
notice from their landlord).
48. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH IN PUB. HOUS., DEMOGRAPHIC FACTS: RESIDENTS LIVING IN PUBLIC
HOUSING 1 (2010).
49. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 30, at 317. Desmond notes that "[a]lthough most lowincome families live unassisted in the private market, most research on housing dynamics has to do with
housing policy and programs. We know much more about public housing (which serves less than 2
percent of the population) than about inner-city landlords and their properties (which constitute the bulk
of housing for the ghetto poor)." Id. at 319.
50. It is important to note the difference between two distinct groups of renters in this Article.
Desmond's research focuses on eviction as a root cause of housing instability and material hardship for
poor tenants in the private rental market. This Article, however, focuses on One-Strike Rule evictions
that arguably cause similar housing instability and material hardship for poor public housing tenants,
particularly poor women with children. Desmond's research is useful in the public housing context,
nonetheless, because subsidized tenants facing eviction are some of the most disadvantaged and at-risk
populations by virtue of the fact that they receive public assistance. It is conceivable that, once public
assistance is terminated upon eviction, public housing tenants fall into an extremely vulnerable class of
the homeless that lacks stable housing options. There are a multitude of reasons why evictees from public
housing will have difficulty navigating private rental market. One plausible explanation is that such
tenants may not be as market savvy as poor private sector tenants who have experienced years of housing
instability and residential mobility in the private market and, presumably, have learned to navigate
market forces accordingly.
51. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 30, at 296.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 318 19.
54. Id.
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piled on the curb, a sheriff present, the possibility of homelessness, etc.).55
Eviction often leads to a number of debilitating conditions that, as will be argued
in this Article, result in serious injustices or unconscionable consequences,56 such
as material hardship. This is likely a cause, not a condition, of poverty that also
results in victimization, risk to health and safety, lack of shelter and food, and
prolonged periods of homelessness.5 7 Residential
instability is also accompanied
by serious social and health disparities. 58 Tenants evicted from housing usually
"must accept conditions far worse than those of their previous dwelling., 59 The
result is a vicious cycle that starts at the bottom, because many landlords will
reject applicants with a history of eviction, which pushes the evicted tenant to the
bottom of the rental market. 60 Eviction, ultimately, falls hardest on single mother
heads of households.6 '
62
The very presence of children in a household increases the risk of eviction.
A recent comprehensive study found striking results regarding the number of
evictions that affected children.63 Over a third of the evicted tenants were single
mothers and of the 353 children that lived with the tenants, 115 received actual
eviction judgments. 64 The average age of the children was seventeen and the
youngest was four months. 65 Thousands of tenants are ejected from their homes
due to informal pressure from landlords.66 Two years after eviction, single
mothers experienced higher rates of material hardship and depression than their
peers as a result of eviction.67 The most devastating forms of material hardship
include homelessness, loss of possessions and a record of eviction.6 8 This has led
researchers to conclude that the increase in material hardship from eviction
causes evicted mothers to experience higher levels of poverty. 69 Desmond
eloquently puts the dire circumstances of poor single mothers facing eviction into
perspective:
55. Id. at 299.
56. See infra Parts III V (discussing the factors considered under Pennsylvania's "serious injustice"
exemption and North Carolina's "unconscionability" rule).
57. Maureen Crane & Anthony Warnes, Evictions and Prolonged Homelessness, 15 HOUSING
STUD. 757, 758 (2000).

58. Tim Jelleyman & Nicholas Spencer, Residential Mfobility in Childhoodand Health Outcomes: A
Systematic Review, 62 J. EP. COM. HEALTH 584 (2008).
59. See Desmond, supra note 28 at 118.
60. Id.
61. See Suzanne M. Bianchi, Feminization & Juvenilization of Poverty: Trends, Relative Risks,
Causes, and Consequences, 25 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 307, 307-09 (1999). According to HUD, single
women are heads of household in 77% of public housing units. See A Picture of Subsidized Households
2000, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.gov/portal/picture2000/index.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
62. See Desmond, supra note 26, at 304.
63. Id. at 314.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Desmond & Kimbro, supra note 30, at 300.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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On some measures, eviction may not simply drop poor mothers
and their children into a dark valley, a trying yet relatively short
section along life's journey; it may fundamentally redirect their
way, casting them onto a different, and much more difficult,
path. If evicted mothers experience higher rates of depression
several years after their forced removal, as our findings indicate,
that suggests that eviction has lasting effects on mothers'
happiness and quality of life. This in turn could affect their
relationships with their romantic partners and children, kin and
neighbors; could cause them to withdraw from social
institutions, dampening their civic engagement and level of
community embeddedness; and could sap their energy,
preventing them from seeking or keeping gainful employment or
participating fully in their children's development.70
What the research has revealed is that neighborhoods with more children may be
more likely to have households who violate certain provisions in the lease
agreement. 71 The effect of eviction, which gives rise to residential mobility and
instability, also has consequences on a child's development, including poor
performance on standardized tests, lower academic achievement, delayed
literacy, and higher high school drop-out rates. 2 Poor single mothers, in other
words, belong to an extremely disadvantaged demographic in the United States
merely because they are mothers.
The One-Strike Rule, arguably, contributes to evictions that lead to material
hardships for public housing tenants. The risk of eviction likely increases in
public housing projects, because a disproportionate number of those receiving
subsidized housing are households headed by poor single mothers who-due to
housing projects located in concentrated, poverty-stricken areas-arguably live
in close proximity to increased criminal activity.74 And for many, public housing
70. Id. at 317.
71. See Desmond, supra note 26, at 319.
72. Alexandria Beatty, Student Alobility: Exploring the Impacts ofFrequent loves on Achievement,
National Academies Press (2010); see also Shana Pribesh & Douglas Downey, WhyAre Residential and
School loves Associated with PoorSchool Performance?, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 521 (1999).
73. See Desmond, supra note 26, at 321. Desmond explains that "[a]lthough the degree to which
discrimination influences the processes of securing an apartment, job, or loan have been thoroughly
studied, analysts largely have ignored how prejudice against minorities, women, or children may
influence the consequential decision of whether to evict. Owing to the frequency of eviction in the lives
of poor families as well as to the host of negative outcomes brought about by eviction, understanding
who landlords put out is just as important as understanding who they let in." Id.
74. Kari Lydersen, Out of Sight; In many cities, being homeless is againstthe law, IN THESE TIMES,
June 12, 2000, at 21. Lydersen finds that "a statistical portrait of public housing tenants reflects a
population that is overwhelmingly minority, female, and very poor: sixty-nine percent of public housing
tenants are minorities, seventy-six percent of the heads of households are females, and the average
household income is $8900. Roughly seventy-five percent of all non-elderly tenants live below the
poverty level . . . Many public housing residents bear the significant burden of providing for their
children thirty-nine percent of tenants are single parents." Id.
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is housing of last resort. Eviction is avoided at all costs, because its short-term
and long-term consequences, particularly for poor urban women and children, are
significant threats to material, physical and mental well-being. The long-term
impact of eviction can be exacerbated by the specter of homelessness. 7'
B. The Problem ofHomelessness
Judge Stanton Wettick, Jr. from Pennsylvania once wrote in an opinion that
"because an eviction from subsidized housing is likely to result in homelessness
or living in substandard housing, the right of a low-income person to continue to
live in subsidized housing is an important right protected by the constitutional
protections afforded to property[.]" 76 Indeed, evictees resort to makeshift
dwellings, slum conditions, or spaces that are uninhabitable upon eviction,77
leading to a cycle of homelessness that contributes to material hardships that last
years after involuntary removal. Peering closely at the concept of homelessness
helps unveil the multitude of hardships facing the evicted, especially single
mothers.
Start with the basics of homelessness. There are two categories of
homelessness that evictees fall into after being dispossessed. The first is "street
homelessness." The street homeless occupy space that is not designed or operated
for residential occupation. The street homeless sleep on benches in parks, settle
on public lots and urban open space, reside in vacant warehouses or alley ways or
find refuge under a bridge. Street homelessness, in essence, is a serious form of
rooflessness.7 8 Of course, without a roof for protection, human beings are subject
to prolonged exposure to the cold and/or extreme heat.79 Street homelessness, and
a natural desire to seek some form of solitude and protection, usually leads to
"sheltered homelessness." 8 The sheltered homeless are those who obtain
emergency or temporary shelters funded or subsidized by local governments or
organized charities through local churches. It even includes crashing on
neighbors' or family members' couches temporarily, if available. Ultimately,
75. See generally Martha Burt, Homeless Families, Singles, and Others: Findingsfrom the 1996
NationalSurvey of Homeless Assistance Providersand Clients, 12 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 737 (2001);
see also Crane & Warnes, supra note 50, at 757; U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND
HOMELESSNESS SURVEY
(2013), http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/2013/1210-reportHH.pdf.
76. See Allegheny Cty. Hous. Auth. v. Arminthia S., 20 Pa. D. & C. 4th 233, 249 (Com. P1. 1993).
77. Mary Shaw, Housing and Public Health, 25 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 397 (2004); Matthew
Desmond and Tracy Shollenberger, Poverty, Housing, and the Mechanisms of Neighborhood Selection,
Address at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, New York (2013) (paper on file with
author).
78. Christina Victor, The Health of Homeless People in Britain: A Review, 7.4 EURO. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH 398 404 (1997).
79. Id.
80. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Homelessness Afuddle, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1990, at 45. See
generally Gerald S. Dickinson, The Blue Moonlight Remedy: Formulatingthe Voucher Scheme into a
New Emergency Housing Remedy in South Africa, 130 S. AFRICAN L.J. 563, 570 (2013).
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however, members of both groups-street homeless and sheltered homelessinvariably lack permanent homes. 8 ' The time between both destinations is where
evidence of the most debilitating hardships may be found.
Homelessness in and of itself increases the risk of respiratory disease,
alcohol and drug dependence, mental health problems, suicide, accidents, and
violence. 8 2 The sheltered homeless, although avoiding rooflessness, may not
actually be much better off than the street homeless. For those who find refuge in
hostels or other shelters, such facilities may lack basic necessities, pose threats to
good hygiene and physical safety, and give rise to potential privacy issues.83
Women rendered homeless are more likely to report acute infectious conditions,
chest infections, colds, coughs, and bronchitis and are more likely to report a lack
of food for nourishment.8 4 Children are equally at risk and "vulnerable owing to
' The additional burden of
the lack of appropriate play space."85
caring for children
as a result of homelessness falls disproportionately on women, who regularly
,stay connected and maintain responsibility for children" while men have a
tendency to separate. 86 Victimization is another serious consequence of
homelessness. Women often report higher rates of crime during a homeless spell,
including higher rates of rape than men.8 7 Martha Burt explains:
Among the many hazards of being homeless, being victimized
through criminal attack epitomizes the vulnerability inherent in
not having four walls and a door. Needing to be constantly on
guard contributes additional stress to circumstances that are
already extremely stressful. Victimization is not a minor event;
the evidence indicates that most homeless people have
experienced it in one form or another during their current spell of
homelessness.88
These are not necessarily short spans of homelessness either. Women with
children could have spells of homelessness lasting up to six months.89 There is
evidence that eviction may be a contributory cause of extended homelessness. 90
Dramatic and frequent moves may also completely sever important social ties
that are "useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young

81. See Shaw, supra note 67, at 407
82. See Victor, supra note 68, at 398 404.
83. Id.

84. See Burt, supra note 64, at 763.
85. See Shaw, supra note 67, at 407.
86. See Burt, supra note 64, at 745.
87. Id. at 753.

88. Id. Burt found that robbery and theft were common forms of victimization among the homeless,
including violations of one's person such as physical and sexual assault.
89. Id. at 747.
90. See Crane & Warnes, supra note 50, at 757.
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person." 9 ' Thus, a dramatic move caused by eviction can have debilitating effects
on the children of families forced to relocate to shelters or the street. Indeed, the
recent sociological literature on eviction helps rethink the usefulness and
limitations of the third-party policing strategies that Congress implemented in
response to the War on Drugs in public housing. As discussed in Parts II and III,
some federal and state courts still rely upon outdated misconceptions of crime
and poverty in America in upholding the One-Strike Rule and use such outdated
modes of policy to find some state landlord tenant laws preempted by federal
law. 92 The problem is that rigorous policing of public housing behavior by PHAs
may also be a contributing factor to the devastating fallout effects of eviction of
poor urban mothers we see from recent sociological research, such as increased
material hardship, residential mobility, and ultimately homelessness.
C. The Rise of Third-PartyPolicing
Third-party policing is a movement within the field of crime control to
spread evenly the responsibility of deterring crime to non-police actors through
the implementation of a variety of local mechanisms. 93 Landlords, of course,

have always had considerable discretion over whether to evict a tenant,
particularly if a tenant defaults on rent payments.94 But the rise of third-party
policing has added a new dimension to the discretion authorized to landlords.
The phenomenon of third-party policing creates a third "governmental"
sector that plays the role of a non-police actor operating somewhere between the
state and civil society. The goal, in essence, is to prevent crime by "activating
non-offending persons who are thought to influence environments where

offenses have occurred or may occur." 95 Given this movement towards shifting
responsibility, landlords have been "coerced into making changes to their
properties, or into controlling the people who live in their properties (through
increased surveillance or evictions), in an effort to control crime." 96 The
assumption under the third-party policing strategy is that community members
91. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY, 300 (1994).

92. To highlight the significance of allowing users of illegal drugs to avoid eviction, courts in
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia, of recent, have consistently reviewed challenges
to the One-Strike Rule by relying upon the findings that Congress made back in 1988 when adopting the
Anti Drug Abuse Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 11901(2) ("[P]ublic and other federally assisted low-income
housing in many areas suffers from rampant drug-related or violent crime."); id. at § 11901(3) ("[D]rug
dealers are increasingly imposing a reign of tenror on public and other federally assisted low-income
housing tenants."); id. at § 11901(4) ("[T]he increase in drug-related and violent crime not only leads to
murders, muggings, and other forms of violence against tenants, but also to a deterioration of the physical
environment that requires substantial government expenditures.").
93. See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 26, at 118. (noting that police have increasingly been
shifting the burden of law enforcement to landlords).
94. Richard Lempert & Ikeda Kiyoshi, Evictions from Public Housing: Effects of Independent
Review, 35 AM. SOCiO. REV. 852, 853 (1970).
95. LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING 2, 118 (2005).

96. Michael Buerger & Lorraine Mazerolle, Third-PartyPolicing: A Theoretical Analysis of an
Emerging Trend, 15 JUST. Q. 301, 301 03 (1998).
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are not only capable of curtailing crime, but also responsible for the crime if it
occurs. 97 Under such a regime, landlords and tenants face "gatekeeper liability." 98
This means that even though a landlord or a tenant may not be directly
involved in or have knowledge of bad acts and misconduct, they are nonetheless
presumed to have been able to prevent the commission of the crime. 99 Indeed,
local, state, and federal regulations directed at third-party policing have been
enacted to coerce landlords and tenants into conforming to this new crime control
scheme, thus altering the behavior of landlords and tenants. As a result, landlords
are forced to regulate their properties and control tenants through increased
surveillance and paternalistic apartment rules, 10 0 while tenants are forced to
investigate, ascertain, and literally peek over their neighbors' fences or report
alleged (even if unfounded) incidents. Many non-police actors with power to
control and prevent crime are PHAs and Section 8 landlords. In fact, PHAs were
specifically challenged to engage in third-party policing strategies by President
Clinton in his State of the Union Address in 1996, directing PHAs and tenant
associations to curtail the rise of drugs in public housing. He stated that "for [sic]
now on, the rule for residents
who commit crime and peddle drugs should be, one
11
0
out.''
you're
and
strike
The responsibility to prevent and control (and in many cases to alleviate)
crime has extended to imposing punitive measures-including eviction-when a
public housing or Section 8 tenant, guest, family member, or visitor has engaged
in drug-related criminal activity or other criminal activity on or near the
premises. However, research suggests that third-party activities were not the most
effective approaches to reducing crime in public housing. 102 In fact, the research
suggests that eviction did not seem to be a proximate and important factor in
reducing drug problems in public housing. 103 Nonetheless, the phenomenon of
third-party policing was at the core of federal regulations giving PHAs the

97. See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 26, at 119; see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
123 (2001).
98. Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2 J. OF
L., Eco. & ORG. 53, 53 104 (1986).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Buerger & Mazerolle, supra note 96; Gretchen Arnold & Megan Slusser, Silencing
Women's Voices: Nuisance Property Laws and Battered Women, L. & SOC. INQ. (2015); Amanda Gavin,
Chronic Nuisance Ordinances: Turning Victims of Domestic Violence into Nuisances in the Eyes of
Municipalities, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 257, 257 78 (2014); Theresa Langley, Living without Protection:
Nuisance PropertyLaw Unduly Burden Innocent Tenants and Entrench Divisions between Impoverished
Communities and Law Enforcement, 52 HOUSING. L. REV. 1255, 1255 86 (2014); Eloisa RodriguezDod, But Ally Lease Isn't up Yet: FindingFaultwith No-FaultEvictions, 35 U. ARK LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
839, 839 70 (2013); Emily Werth, Stemming the Tide of Crime-FreeRental Housing and NuisanceProperty Ordinances, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 349, 349 407 (2014); Greg Koehle, Controlling Crime
and Disorder in Rental Properties: The Perspective of the Rental Property Aflanager, 14 W.
CRIMINOLOGY REV. 53, 53-60 (2013).
101. See Bill Clinton, President of the United States of America, Address at the State of the Union.
(Jan. 23, 1996), in 142 CONG. REC. H768, H770.
102. See Mazerolle & Ransley, supra note 95, at 118.
103. Id.
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
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authority to evict tenants for drug-related criminal activity and at the heart of the
United States Supreme Court decision to uphold the policy
in United States
04
Departmentof Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker.1
II. RUCKER AND THE ONE-STRIKE RULE
A. Anti-Drug Abuse Act 42 U.S.C. § 1437
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, under 42 U.S.C. § 1437,
in an effort to address the concern of drug dealers' "reign of terror on public and
other federally assisted low-income housing tenants."' 15 The Act, later amended,
stated that:
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which... provide
that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any
drug related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in
by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's
household, or any guest or other person under06 the tenant's
control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy. 1
The One-Strike Rule lease provision has been the primary third-party policing
mechanism to effectuate an eviction of a federally-subsidized tenant, his guest, or
his family member who engages in drug-related criminal activity. The purpose of
this "no-fault" strict-liability eviction policy is to extend third-party policing to
PHAs and subsidized leaseholders, who are arguably in the best position to
curtail crime and misconduct in neighborhoods prone to criminal activity, such as
public housing projects.
HUD also instituted its own regulations that gave effect to 42 U.S.C. § 1437,
requiring that the "lease must provide that drug-related criminal activity engaged
in, on or off the premises by any tenant, member of the tenant's household or
guest, and any such activity engaged in on the premises by any other person
under the tenant's control, is grounds for the PHA to terminate tenancy.' 0 7
HUD, however, did not mandate immediate eviction. Instead it gave discretion to
the PHA to consider all the circumstances of an eviction case and to take into
account the "seriousness of the offending action, the extent of participation by
the leaseholder in the offending action, the effects that the eviction would have
104. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
105. Id.
106. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5101, 102 Stat. 4181, 4300 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (1990)); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101625, § 504, 104 Stat 4079, 4185 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5) (1990)); Housing Opportunity
Program Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat 834 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5)
(1990)).
107. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1)(5)(i)(B) (2008).
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on family members . . . and the extent to which the leaseholder has shown

personal responsibility.' 0l 8
B. Ninth CircuitFinds One-Strike Rule "Absurd"
The Rucker case arose in California. The Oakland Housing Authority moved
to evict Pearlie Rucker, a public housing tenant. Rucker's daughter, who was
mentally challenged, was arrested for drug possession three blocks from
Rucker's apartment unit. 10 9 Rucker was not alone. Three other evictions were
joined with Rucker's lawsuit. The evictions involved circumstances where a
family member or guest, not the leaseholder, was convicted of drug-related
criminal activity committed off-premises. 110
The argument employed by the Plaintiff, Rucker, was that 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(1)(6) violated the leaseholders' due process rights by holding them
accountable even if they did not know of or have control over the person
engaging in the drug-related criminal activity."' In other words, if the tenant of
record did not know or have reason to know of a family member, household
member, or guest who was involved in drug-related criminal activity, then the
tenant of record could not be subject to the One-Strike lease provision required
under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6)." 2 Prior to Rucker, some courts held that due
process required evidence that the tenant have knowledge of the criminal
activity. "3

The Ninth Circuit found in favor of the tenants, holding that the statute was
ambiguous and would generate absurd results with regards to the innocent tenant
if PHAs were to hold leaseholders strictly liable for any criminal activity of
guests, family members, or household members, even if he or she did not have
knowledge of the activity. Indeed, the court raised serious questions regarding
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the federal
regulation permitted tenants to be deprived of their property interest without any
relationship to individual wrongdoing. The "absurdity and unjustness of the
108. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(I)(5)(vii)(B) (2008).
109. Rucker v. Davis 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), rev 'd sub nom. Dep't of Hous.
& Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
110. Id.
111. Paul Stinson, RestoringJustice: How Congress Can Amend the One-Strike Laws in FederallySubsidized Public Housing to Ensure Due Process,Avoid Inequity, and Combat Crime, 11 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 435, 459 61 (2004).
112. Some eviction cases before the Rucker decision denied evictions if the tenant had no
knowledge. See United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D.N.Y.1991). Judge
Jack B. Weinstein stated in this opinion, "For the poor, the shortage of livable, low-priced housing is
especially acute. Tenants and especially their minor children who are evicted are likely to become
homeless, with whatever stability their lives afforded seriously jeopardized . . . the owner of the
defendant leasehold is entitled to retain her home. Her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren,
who look to her for shelter as the family's matriarch, may not be dispossessed because one of them has
sold drugs from their apartment." Id.
113. Caroline Castle, You Call That A Strike? A Post-Rucker Examination of Eviction from Public
Housing Due to Drug-RelatedCriminalActivity of a Third Party,37 GA.L.REV.1435, 1437 38 (2003).
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potential results," according to the Ninth Circuit, showed that HUD missed the
mark in discerning Congress's intent. 114 The Supreme Court thought otherwise,
finding that Congress had no intention to include the innocent tenant defense.
C. Supreme Court Upholds Strict-LiabilityRule
The no-fault rule was at the epicenter of the Supreme Court ruling in Rucker.
The Court narrowly reviewed the language set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988,"1 which was passed by Congress over concerns about the rise of drug
dealers." 6 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision finding that 42 U.S.C.

§ 1437d(1)(6)"

7

unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public

housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related
activity of household members and guests, whether or not the tenant knew, or
should have known about the activity. " 8

The Court further found that the "statute does not require the eviction of any
tenant who violated the lease provision. Instead, it entrusts that decision to the
local PHAs who are in the best position to take account of, among other things,
the degree to which the housing project suffers from 'rampant drug-related or
violent crime."'119 The Court also validated HUD's definition of "control,"
stating that a visitor, guest, or family member is under the control of the
leaseholder when the leaseholder has permitted that person, even a one-time
visitor, to access the premises. 120 And HUD rejected regulations that created

fault-based defenses to eviction, such as lack of knowledge or the absence of
control over the guest or family member who engaged in criminal activity, to
mitigate the reoccurrence of drug activity.' 2' The Court reiterated Congress's
intent to permit the PHA to determine the seriousness of the offending action and
114. See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1124.
115. 42 U.S.C. §1437d(l)(5) (1988). ("[P]ublic housing agency shall utilize leases which...provide
that a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or a guest or other person under the
tenant's control shall not engage in criminal activity, on or near public housing premises, while the tenant
is a tenant in public housing, and such criminal activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy.").
116. See Rucker, 535 U.S. at 125.
117. The Supreme Court concluded in Rucker that, "Section 1437d(I)(6) requires lease terms that
give local public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of
the household or guest engages in drug related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should
have known, of the drug-related activity." Id at 133 34.
118. In Rucker, four public housing tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority argued that they
could not be evicted from their public housing residences since the tenants did not engage in drug-related
criminal activity. Instead, the criminal activity was conducted by the grandsons of one tenant, the
daughter of another tenant, and the caregiver of a third tenant. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 128.
119. The Supreme Court further noted the seriousness of the offending action and the extent to
which the leaseholder has taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action: "It is not
'absurd' that a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drugrelated activity. Such "no-fault" eviction is a common incident of tenant responsibility under normal
landlord-tenant law .... Strict liability maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties." Id. at
133 34.
120. Id. at 131.
121. Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567 (Oct. 11, 1991).
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the extent to which the leaseholder has taken all reasonable steps to prevent or
mitigate the offending action.
III.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE POST-RUCKER ERA

A. FederalPreemption Question in State Landlord-TenantLaw
This Part explores an important issue that may control the fate of the OneStrike Rule: federal preemption. In the last several years, there have been few
reported cases that have denied a subsidized eviction on One-Strike Rule grounds
or found that such an eviction survives Rucker.122 The Rucker decision essentially
gutted the fault requirement that many state courts had previously read into the
federal regulations. But the Pennsylvania serious injustice exemption and North
Carolina unconscionability rule, recently brought to light in Somerville and
Lofton, beg the question of whether
the statutes run afoul of Rucker and are
23
preempted by federal regulations. 1

The preemption issue arises where there are questions concerning the express
or implied federal preemption of state laws, particularly where Congress
mandates a legal effect notwithstanding state law.124 Where the federal statute or
regulation is not ambiguous, the court must give deference to the statutory
language. 125 Ordinarily, a court must find compelling evidence of a federal
intention to preempt before ruling that a federal housing law will preempt a state
housing law. 126 There is a presumption "against finding preemption of state law
in areas traditionally regulated by the States.', 127 Indeed, landlord-tenant law is

traditionally a local matter.128 When faced with preemption, courts are to assume
122. Antonia M. Konkoly, Post-Rucker Decisions:Six Years Later, 38 HOuSING L. BULL. 187, 187
(2008).
123. See infra Parts IV-V.
124. An implied federal preemptive law is when the federal statute occupies a field of law leaving
no room for state action. Preemption can arise, alternatively, when there is a direct and positive conflict
between the federal and state law such that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently applied together.
Lastly, there is the express intent of the federal law by Congress to override the state law that triggers
federal preemption. There is a presumption, however, against federal preemption. In analyzing
preemption issues, courts are to assume that the historic police powers of the states are not superseded
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. However, it is unclear how this is applied
where state landlord-tenant law intervenes where federal provisions also apply. See California v. ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989); Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130; Hous. Auth. of Everett v. Terry, 789 P.2d
745 (Wash. 1990); U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 1 et seq.; Kelly v. Washington ex. Re. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 10
(1937) (quoting Sinnot, 63 U.S. at 243). See generally State v. Williams, 617 P.2d 1012 (Wash. 1980);
Kelly v. Washington ex. Re. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. 227 (1859);
Kelly, 302 U.S. at 9; State v. Williams, 617 P.2d 1012 (Wash. 1980).
125. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 133 34.
126. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that federal law will
"not preempt state law in areas traditionally reserved for the states unless that was the "clear and manifest
purpose of Congress").
127. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
128. Jaffe v. Clarke, 566 F. Supp. 1500, 1502 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding that "[1]andlord-tenant
law, especially under elaborate municipal housing codes, is characteristically complex and of peculiarly
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that the historic police powers of the states
are not superseded unless that was the
29
1
Congress.
of
purpose
manifest
clear and
Some areas of state housing law are expressly preempted by federal housing
regulations. For instance, states may not charge monthly rent exceeding thirtypercent of a federally-subsidized tenant's household income. 130 Likewise, a
federally-subsidized tenant's right to inspect documents upon termination
preempts state law."'3 Tenants may also invoke state or local protections under 24
C.F.R. § 247.6(c)1 2 and can exercise their right to grievance hearings and other
procedures. 33
'
There is still much consternation about whether the One-Strike Rule
provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) preempt state landlord-tenant laws. On
the surface, the One-Strike Rule provisions do not expressly override state
landlord-tenant law procedures. While the "no-fault" framework implies a strictliability justification to evict for drug-related criminal activity, the "good cause"
provisions show a strong intent to defer to local PHAs and state courts to work
out eviction cases. Nowhere does 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) or Rucker require or
mandate an eviction when the grounds for complete eviction have been met.
The Court in Rucker seemed to give credence to the preemption issue, stating
that the "government is not attempting to criminally punish or civilly regulate"
the tenants, but is "acting as a landlord of property that it owns.
This suggests,
arguably, that it would "be hard to find an area of law in which the states have a
local applicability and interest"); Troupe v. Fairview Apartments, 464 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)
(stating that "landlord-tenant law is peculiarly a matter of state and local concern").
129. SeeAbrams, 897 F.2d at 41; U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 1 et seq.
130. Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 123, 83 Stat. 389 (1969). The Brooke Amendment capped federallysubsidized tenants' monthly rent payments at 30% of the tenants' incomes, notwithstanding local or state
rent caps exceeding that amount. See Dorsey v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 984 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.
1993); Crochet v. Hous. Auth. of Tampa, 37 F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 1994). See generally Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (explaining that a 30% rent cap provided
by the Brooke Amendment creates a federal right to benefit enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1X6) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); see also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(m)
(2000). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1X6), federally mandated procedures require local housing authorities
to permit a tenant to review documents of record prior to and during eviction proceedings. State law is
not permitted to deny federally subsidized tenants that right.
132. "A tenant may rely on State and local law governing eviction procedures where such law
provides the tenant procedural rights which are in addition to those provided by this subpart, except
where such State or local law has been preempted under part 246 of this chapter or by other action of the
United States." 24 C.F.R. § 247.6(c).
133. Tenancy and Administrative Grievance Procedure for Public Housing, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,216,
33,257 (Aug. 30, 1988) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 904, 905, 913, 960, 966). ("State law may not override
rights under Federal law or regulation, but may give a tenant the right to additional protections. Federal
statute and regulation governing lease rights and termination of tenancy in the public housing program is
not a comprehensive scheme that precludes other State regulation concerning this subject. To the
contrary, it is assumed that the procedural and substantive law affecting a tenancy in the public housing
program is compounded of elements established by both Federal and State law. State laws are binding
without incorporation in a Federal rule, or in the Federally-required lease requirements. State tenant
protections may be enforced through the State courts or other procedures available under State law,
without any need to create a Federal right to State law protections.").
134. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 125, 135.
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greater interest or have had greater involvement than in the legal area of
landlord-tenant."' 35 It is probably the case that "state courts have been and should
continue to be" the venue where landlord-tenant disputes, including subsidized
evictions on the grounds of drug-related criminal activity, are resolved. 1 6 If so,
federal preemption of state landlord-tenant law would be difficult to conceive.
The issues presented in Rucker have not returned to the Supreme Court for
review, although the Court denied certiorarion a case that would have brought
the One-Strike Rule back into the limelight, this time under the scope of federal
preemption. 3 7 Time will tell whether the issue comes before the Court again.
There are plenty of signs, however, that it will. Many state courts wrestle with
the preemption issue at the trial level and increasingly state appellate courts are
faced with some rendition of a conflict between a state landlord-tenant statute
and the federal regulations.
B. State Courts Divided on Preemption
The Court in Rucker pointed to the fact that public housing tenants have a
property interest in their leasehold interest."38 Such leasehold interest disputes, on
the facts, are invariably resolved first at the state level eviction proceeding. Thus,
state law governs and regulates the administration of public housing leases by
PHAs, and, by implication, the federal regulations would not displace or replace
the traditional relationship between landlords and tenants at the state level. But

some state courts have found otherwise.
In Boston Housing Authority v. Garcia,139 the tenant employed a "special
circumstances" defense to show that he could not have foreseen or prevented the

135. Perry v. Hous. Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1216 (4th Cir. 1981).
136. See Andersonv. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (W.D. Va. 1973).
137. Ross v. Broadway Towers Inc., 228 S.W.3d 113, 121 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), cert denied,
128 S.Ct. 543 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case that would have reviewed
the central issues in Rucker regarding whether equitable defenses are preempted by the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act. In Ross, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the waiver provision of a state landlord-tenant law
was preempted by federal law as interpreted under Rucker. The leaseholder had signed an authorization
for Broadway Towers to conduct a criminal background check using a slightly different iteration of the
tenant's name. The tenant and her boyfriend were subsequently approved to live on the premises.
However, the landlord later discovered that the tenant had a felony forgery conviction under a slightly
different name. After learning of the conviction, Broadway Towers served a notice of non-compliance on
the tenant. The Tennessee court upheld the eviction, finding that federal regulations guided such
evictions. In light of case law leaning towards federal preemption of Rucker One-Strike evictions, there is
case law that provides some guidance on circumstances where federal preemption fails.
138. Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135; accord Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 444 (1982) (holding that an
effort to deprive a tenant of such a right without proper notice violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
139. 871 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (2007) (holding that a "special circumstances" defense was implicitly
preempted by Rucker). The tenant's son was arrested after a police officer stopped the motor vehicle he
was driving without a driver's license. The officer discovered a bag containing marijuana. At the time of
arrest, the tenant's son gave his mother's address and the son was subsequently charged with possession
of a class D substance. A state landlord-tenant law in Massachusetts provides for a "special
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criminal activity from occurring on the premises. 140 The court, however, held that
such a defense was preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) by iterating (1) that
the special circumstances defense stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6), and (2) that the PHA has
the discretion, regardless of whether or not the tenant knew or should have
known about the activity and regardless of whether the tenant was even capable
of stopping the activity. The court stated that if it had found in favor of the tenant
and upheld the state law, the special circumstances defense would permit a public
housing tenant to defeat a lease termination based on the acts of a household
member by establishing that he or she could not have foreseen or prevented the
misconduct.141 The court further reasoned that giving a trial court such authority
would override the use of the PHA's discretion to evict and42would run afoul of,
and substantially interfere with, the congressional objective. 1
In Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P.lAtl. Terrace Apartments, the
tenant argued that the notice was deficient by not correctly giving her the 30-day
opportunity to cure the violation and the notice failed to adequately explain to her
the grounds for eviction. 14 Under D.C. Code § 42-3505.01(b), a discrete
provision of the District's Rental Housing Act first adopted by the Council of the
District of Columbia in 1985, "[a] housing provider may recover possession of a
rental unit where the tenant is violating an obligation of tenancy and fails to
correct the violation within 30 days after receiving from the housing provider a
notice to correct the violation or vacate. ' 'i 44
The court found that the landlord was not required to provide the tenant with
a cure notice before eviction proceedings, even if the cure provision in the state
Rental Housing Act applied. The court also reasoned that enforcing D.C. Code §
42-3505.01 (b), the Act's cure provision, would frustrate the federal law under 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B). The court further found that § 42-3505.01(b) does not
necessarily require landlords to provide a notice to cure when there is evidence
that a tenant committed a discrete criminal act in violation of the lease. Thus,
while not directly an issue of preemption, the federal regulations supersede such
circumstances" or "innocent tenant" defense to be raised in the face of an eviction on the grounds of
unlawful conduct of a household member. Id. at 1074 75 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, § 32).
140. Id. at 1075.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1078.
143. 890 A.2d 249, 249 59 (D.C. 2006). The tenant's cousin entered her apartment and began an
altercation with her. The tenant's boyfriend pulled out a shotgun and fatally shot the tenant's cousin. The
police found a loaded twelve-gauge semi-automatic shotgun next to the water heater in the furnace room,
a loaded semi-automatic pistol under the seat cushion of a couch, a box of Remington shotgun
ammunition containing twenty-three shotgun shells, and a box of cartridges for the semi-automatic pistol.
The boyfriend was acquitted of murder, but was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm and
ammunition. The landlord proceeded to evict the tenant for the criminal activity on the premises. On
February 15, 2003, a professional process servicer posted a notice on the tenant's apartment door and
then went to the post office and mailed copies of the notice to her and the District of Columbia
Department of Regulatory Affairs.
144. See D.C. Code § 42-3505.01(b).
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state laws. The Housing Authority further argued that, while the D.C. law
provided the tenant an opportunity to correct the unlawful possession of a loaded
shotgun, the enforcement of the requirement would frustrate the objectives of the
federal program and would "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." A case in Kentucky,
however, paves a path leaning toward finding no federal preemption.
In Housing Authority of Covington v. Turner,145 the court reviewed the issue
of whether a public housing tenant has a right to remedy the breach of the lease
pursuant to KRS § 383.6601(1) under the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act (URLTA) and whether the statute is preempted by federal law. In
Turner, the tenant was being evicted for drug-related criminal activity. Cocaine
was found in the room where the tenant's nephew resided. At the time of the
police search of the premises, the tenant was at work and testified at trial that she
did not have knowledge of the drugs in her apartment, essentially relying on the
innocent tenant defense.
Under KRS § 383.6601 (1), "Evictions for Criminal Activity or Drug-Related
Criminal Activity will be governed by the URLTA as adopted by the State of
Kentucky and the City of Covington and will not be governed by the grievance
procedure of the authority.' 146 The statute essentially provides for an opportunity
for the tenant to "remedy" a breach in the lease agreement. The PHA argued that
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) preempted KRS § 383.660(1). However, the trial court
found that the tenant's action of barring her nephew from the apartment was
sufficient to remedy the drug-related criminal activity, and thus denied the
eviction of the tenant.
In its reasoning, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reiterated that "intrusions
into the traditional powers of the states are not favored and, therefore, there is a
presumption against preemption of state statutes and regulations.', 147 Thus, the
court found no prohibition under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) that precluded a tenant
from remedying a violation of the lease agreement and that there was "no
irreconcilable conflict between the statutes.' ' 148 In arriving at its decision, the
court, unanimously, found that the PHA had failed to adequately demonstrate
that it had weighed the policy considerations behind the federal statute. 149 The
court disagreed with the notion that a remedy provision under KRS §
383.6601(1) defeated the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6). The court
eloquently reiterated the lower court's decision, stating:
[R]ather than the provision of an opportunity to remedy being an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the Anti-Drug
Activity law, a tenant who has been served with notice of the
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

295 S.W.3d 123, 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 127.
See id.
Id. at 125,128.
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intent to evict has clear knowledge of the provision, and having
been given the opportunity to remedy may be among the most
likely of tenants to prevent the situation from recurring, thereby
furthering the purposes of and objectives of the law. 50
The court also seemed to turn the strict-liability, third-party policing strategy of
the One-Strike Rule onto itself by arguing that the right to remedy illegal drug
activity is, in and of itself, consistent with the Congressional objective of
discouraging illegal drug use in public housing because a tenant who has "been
given the opportunity to remedy may be among the most likely of tenants to
prevent the situation from recurring, thereby furthering the purposes of and
objectives of the [federal] law.""' Indeed, "conferring the opportunity to remedy
the violation is, in this court's view, in conformity with the cautionary remarks of
the United States Supreme Court and HUD.' 52 Other courts have followed the
same reasoning as to whether Rucker provides a basis for preempting or limiting
a court's equity powers.
In Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Harris,'53 the trial court
denied the eviction of the tenant after the tenant testified that she was unaware
that her guest was in possession of drugs. The court concluded that PHAs may,
but are not required to, evict under Rucker or the federal regulation. The court's
reading of the federal regulations was consistent with the letter published by
HUD shortly after the Rucker decision, which advised PHAs to consider the
seriousness of the offense before pursuing eviction. Importantly, the court stated
that, despite the existence of a lease violation, courts may "weigh all equitable
considerations in determining whether a forfeiture is to be declared."' 5 4 The court
stated:
And the federal law on terminating a public housing tenancy for
the criminal conduct of a guest does not preempt the equity
authority of the court to exercise its discretion to enter judgment
in favor of an innocent tenant and against the PHA in an eviction
action. Rucker does not alter this conclusion and does not
provide a basis for preempting or limiting this court's equity
155
powers.

150. Id. at 123, 127.
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id.
153. 861 N.E.2d 179. The tenant's guest was arrested on a federal warrant. The police searched the
guest upon entering the premises and found crack cocaine is his pocket, however, the police did not find
any other drugs or paraphernalia upon a sweep of the entire premises. The Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority sought to evict the tenant on the grounds of violating the criminal activity lease
provisions, which prohibited any drug-related activity on or off the premises.
154. Id. (citing S. Hotel Co. v. Miscott Inc., 337 N.E.2d 660, 661 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)).
155. Harris,861 N.E.2d at 181 (citations omitted).
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Indeed, the court was satisfied that the innocent tenant defense permitted the
magistrate court to utilize its discretion to deny the eviction on the principle of
equity. When weighing positive and negative factors before eviction, courts have
emphasized the importance of a fair and balanced evidentiary hearing in eviction
proceedings. But in Dayton Metro Housing Authority v. Kilgore,5 6 the Ohio
Court of Appeals focused its decision on Congress's intent to permit no-fault
evictions and held that a trial court erred by taking into account "equitable
considerations" permitted under Ohio law to deny an eviction. The court stated,
"By relying on the innocent-tenant defense ...

courts run the risk of preventing

operation of the enforcement mechanism for which the statute provides,
undermining the policy. That outcome would be inconsistent with the obligation
of equity to follow the law."'1 7 The Court further elaborated on this point:
Kilgore was likewise actually innocent of the drug-related
criminal activity of her two guests, and they apparently
concealed from her their plans to engage in it. However, by
making her apartment open and available to [other persons] as
she did, Kilgore furthered her guests' criminal purpose to use that
location to engage in drug-related criminal activity. The federal
statute makes no exception for inadvertence in relation to its
purpose of protecting residents of federally financed housing
from drug-related criminal activity. The result may appear
draconian, but Rucker observed that 'strict liability maximizes
deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties."58
And in Milwaukee City Housing Authority v. Cobb, 5 9 a Wisconsin statute that
provided a five-day right-to-cure period was held to be preempted by 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(1)(6). The tenant, who rented an apartment from the Housing Authority of
the City of Milwaukee (HACM), violated his lease by engaging in drug-related
criminal activity. The tenant's lease, however, did not have the One-Strike Rule
lease provision, and thus was subject to the state law under Wis. Stat. §
704.17(2)(b). The HACM argued that the right to remedy provision under Wis.
Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
Congress's goal to give PHAs discretion to evict for drug-related criminal
activity. The court decided that the federal regulations preempted the state
statute.
Relying upon Scarborough and Boston Housing Authority, the court found
that a right to remedy provision conflicts with the federal regulations in two
related respects. 160 First, the court stated that a right to cure past illegal drug
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

958 N.E.2d 187, 192.
Dayton Afetro. Hous.Auth., 958 N.E.2d at 191.
Id. at 192.
860 N.W.2d 267, 279 (Wis. 2015).
Id. at 276.
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16 1
activity is counter to Congress's goal of providing drug-free public housing.
Second, a right to cure past illegal drug activity is in conflict with Congress's
method of achieving that goal by allowing eviction of tenants who engage in
drug-related criminal activity. 162 Indeed, the court upheld the troubling thirdparty policing tactics set forth under federal regulations, even where tenants
showed utmost effort to deter criminal activity. However, the abuse of discretion
standard, as opposed to a right to remedy provision, has stood as another method
for which subsidized tenants63 can fight the unrealistic third-party policing tactics
that Congress has imposed. 1

In Bennington Housing Authority v.Bush, 164 the Vermont Supreme Court
ruled that a local PHA (the BHA) had abused its discretion by not considering
alternatives to eviction after a background check discovered that a member of a
tenant's household had a felony conviction from ten years earlier, which was not
disclosed on the tenant's housing application. The tenant admitted she was aware
of the prior criminal record, but did not know the specifics such as whether he
had been convicted of a felony. The tenant offered to exclude the offender from
the apartment as a remedy in order that the tenant could remain, but the property
manager refused such an alternative.
In Vermont, the standard for civil disputes where an administrative agency is
making a determination on eviction is the abuse of discretion standard. The
standard, in other words, is whether another reasonable person acting under the
same circumstance would have resorted to another course of action. The Vermont
Supreme Court found that the trial court's articulation of the abuse of discretion
standard was in error and reversed the decision. The Supreme Court reviewed the
abuse of discretion standard as to whether the BHA "failed to exercise . . .
discretion altogether or exercised it for reasons that are clearly untenable or
unreasonable.', 165 The Court reasoned that the BHA may evict the entire family,
but that it "need not do so" and "should not do so without considering all of the
available options." Evicting the entire family, the Court reasoned, was not the
only option available, particularly because the tenant offered to remove her

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Hornstein, supra note 21, at 2.
164. 933 A.2d 207, 220 (Vt. 2007). In April of 2000, the tenant and her daughter were homeless.
The tenant filed an application for public housing. In her application, the tenant listed herself as head of
household and provided the requisite information on her income, vehicles, previous landlord, and
personal references. The application asked about criminal history and the tenant answered those
questions in the negative. However, tenant did not disclose the criminal history of her household
member, the father of the child. But the tenant testified that she did not think the child's father's criminal
history was required on the form. The Bennington Housing Authority (BHA) ran a background check on
the couple, which revealed no criminal history in Vermont. The BHA then approved the family for a
subsidized unit and the family has lived there since May of 2000. In March of 2005, after the BHA
conducted a subsequent background search, the tenant received a notice of termination on the grounds of
giving false information and misrepresentation in the criminal background portion of the application.
165. Bennington Hous.Auth., 933 A.2d at 212; see also Herald Ass'n Inc., v. Dean, 816 A.2d 469,
478 (Vt. 2002) (setting forth the abuse of discretion standard).
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boyfriend. The Court said that the federal regulations are not so "black and
white" and "are not inflexible.', 166 The BHA may overlook the drug history of the
tenant or the household member if the person is no longer engaging in drug abuse
or has been rehabilitated. 161
Further, the underlying community health and safety goals of the federal
regulations are not met by removing the entire family, particularly when criminal
activity has not occurred for five years. The federal advisory information
counsels against PHAs following inflexible rules because debilitating hardships
caused by eviction are very case-specific for poor tenants facing the loss of
subsidized housing. As the Court in Bush stated:
[F]ederal advisory information counsels against the application
of rigid rules in public housing because of the hardship that
arises when tenants lose their housing. Thus, any reasonable
approach to this problem should have included a balancing in
this particular case of the current situation and tenant history
against a failure to include information in the original
application. In the end, it is still BHA's decision, but the decision
must not be made arbitrarily or without an apparent
consideration of the alternatives laid out in the regulations. 168
Indeed, when determining whether to evict an entire family, PHAs should
include an "opportunity [for the tenant] to present evidence and arguments about
the circumstances that might move the decision maker to impose a penalty less
severe than termination."1 69 A New Jersey appellate court in Oakwood Plaza
Apartments v. Smith extended the abuse of discretion standard to Section 8
landlords. 170 There, the court found that the Rucker decision did not mandate
eviction, but instead permits eviction only after weighing the "positive and
negative factors" and the circumstances leading to the eviction, as outlined in the
federal regulations. 17 1 The
also stated that the ultimate decision should not
• court
,172
be "arbitrary or capricious.
Thus, the New Jersey court concluded that it was
the trial court, not the PHA, which has the responsibility to determine whether
the landlord appropriately exercised its discretion in a manner consistent with the

federal regulations. 173
166. See Bush, 933 A.2d at 213.
167. See 24 C.F.R. § 960.202(a)(2)(iii); 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(1).
168. See Bush, 933 A.2d at 213.
169. Wojcik v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 845 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
170. 800 A.2d 265, 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also Jersey City Hous. Auth. v. Ford, No. A-5657-08T3, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 3118 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (extending the Oakwood Plaza decision by finding that
trial courts must review the discretion exercised by PHAs under the abuse of discretion standard, thus
affirming PHAs' requirements to weigh all the relevant circumstances prior to evicting).
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The post-Rucker era of evictions is unremarkable to say the least: a tenant,
guest or family engages in a "bad act" that violates the lease; the landlord
discovers the activity, then pursues eviction and finally removes the tenant with
the authorization of the court. It's quite simple. As mentioned in Parts II and III,
rulings, such as Scarborough, Boston HousingAuthority and Cobb, still continue
to highlight the significance of allowing users of illegal drugs to avoid eviction
by relying upon the findings that Congress made, back in 1988, when adopting
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act when reviewing challenges to the One-Strike Rule and
holding federal law preempts state landlord tenant law. 174 There are, however,
principles of law and equity available in Pennsylvania and North Carolina that
serve as a different approach for tenants seeking to fight evictions. These
principles of law and equity serve as an important foundation for a new eviction
jurisprudence that attacks Rucker and the federal regulations. As proposed in
Parts IV and V, recent sociological research on evictions and urban poverty may
help substantiate the need for trial courts to use more, not less, discretion to deny
evictions that result in serious injustices or unconscionable results.

IV. EVICTION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND NORTH CAROLINA
Prior to Rucker, Pennsylvania courts, like other state courts, were less likely
to presume that the tenant had knowledge of criminal activity. For example,
Judge Wettick, in Allegheny County Housing Authority v. Arminthia,'175 did not
review an eviction matter with the presumption that a tenant was aware of her
son's drug-related criminal activities simply because her son lived with her.
Although Pennsylvania still provides for an abuse of discretion standard, 176 prior
to Rucker Wettick was aware of and instituted a fault-based approach to
subsidized evictions, stating "federal law may not create a presumption that every
tenant has knowledge of any drug-related criminal activities of each member of

174. See 42 U.S.C. § 11901(2) ("[P]ublic and other federally assisted low-income housing in many
areas suffers from rampant drug-related or violent crime."); id. at § 11901(3) ("[D]rug dealers are
increasingly imposing a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-income housing
tenants."); id. at § 11901(4) ("[T]he increase in drug-related and violent crime not only leads to murders,
muggings, and other forms of violence against tenants, but also to a deterioration of the physical
environment that requires substantial government expenditures.").
175. 20 Pa. D. & C. 4th 233, 237 (Com. Pl. 1993).
176. See, e.g., Allegheny Cty. Hous. Auth. v. Liddell, 722 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
Trial courts ordinarily will not override the decisions by governmental bodies or administrative tribunals
involving acts of discretion "in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power;"
further, "they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the details of the manner adopted to
carry them into execution." Id. Liddell furthered this standard in the context of evictions, stating that "the
mere possession of discretionary power by an administrative body does not make it wholly immune from
judicial review, but the scope of that review is limited to the determination of whether there has been a
manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or
functions. That the court might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the agency
is not a sufficient ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative
discretion." Id.
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77
the tenant's household conducted on the property of the housing complex.",1
Pennsylvania courts followed suit.
In Housing Authority of York v. Ismond,17 the court determined that the
language contained within the Federal Register indicated that a mere conviction
is not the only factor to be considered by the PHA when deciding whether to
terminate public housing assistance. The court held that a family in public
housing could not be evicted solely on the basis of a juvenile's drug-related
criminal activity without reviewing all of the circumstances of the eviction. 179 In
Delaware County Housing Authority v. Bishop,'80 the court found that a PHA
does not have complete discretion to evict a tenant who was unaware of the
criminal activity of her son.
In Woodland Manor Apartments v. Flowers, the tenant's brother was
convicted of drug-related criminal activity inside the tenant's unit.i" The tenant
did not know of the presence of drugs or the paraphernalia in her apartment. In
fact, a testifying officer also had no reason to believe the tenant was part of the
illegal activity. The tenant lived in Section 8 project-based "new construction"
housing, 11 2 requiring the lease agreement between the tenant and owner of the
unit provide "any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises,
engaged in by a tenant of any unit, any member of the tenant's household, or any
guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of
tenancy.""" The court found that where a public housing tenant is not personally
at fault, by commission or omission, for the drug-related activity of a member of
her household or guest, no good cause exists for termination of the lease and
eviction. However, leading up to the Rucker decision, some Pennsylvania courts
leaned toward giving full deference to the PHA in evictions.
In Liddell,18 4 the PHA started eviction proceedings against a tenant when his
visitor was arrested for drug-related activity. The visitor maintained the tenant's
apartment as his mailing address. The trial court ruled in favor of the PHA,
finding any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises was grounds
for eviction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision, stating that the
court would not second-guess the actions of administrative agencies unless the
actions were in bad faith, fraudulent, capricious or an abuse of power.85

177. Arminthia, 20 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 237. Wettick goes on to state that "[c]onsequently, the issue in
this case is whether the Constitution bars a public housing agency from terminating this lease of a tenant
for criminal drug-related activity of a minor child where there is no evidence that the tenant knew of the
activity." Id. at 238.
178. Hous. Auth. of Yorkv. Ismond, 700 A.2d 559, 562 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), aff'd 729 A.2d 70
(Pa. 1999).
179. Id.

180. 749 A.2d 997 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 2000).
181. 39 Pa. D. & C.4th 202, 202 (Com. P1. 1998).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(2)(A).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5).
184. 722 A.2d 750 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1998) (also involving Section 8 termination).
185. See Liddell, A.2d at 753. The court in Liddell stated that "courts will not review the actions of
governmental bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the absence of bad faith,
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The tides changed drastically after the Rucker decision. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was quick to rely on the Supreme Court's Rucker ruling to permit
PHAs to evict even if the tenant did not know or had no reason to know of the
drug-related criminal activity. In HousingAuthority ofPittsburgh v. Fields,8 6 the
Court reversed a Commonwealth Court decision that found that a tenant should
not be evicted for his son's arrest on public housing property for possession of a
controlled substance, given that the son was merely listed on the lease as a
household member. Therefore, the Authority did not meet its burden of proving
that the tenant's son was under the tenant's control. In reversing, the PA Supreme
Court declined to write an opinion, merely stating that the Rucker ruling
influenced the reversal. And in Allegheny County Housing Authority v.
Johnson,187 the court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a
matter of law in not evicting the defendant from a public housing unit even
though he repeatedly violated the lease.
A. Pennsylvania'sExpedited Eviction ofDrug Traffickers Act
Several years before the Rucker decision was handed down, the Pennsylvania
Legislature enacted the Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers Act, creating an
entirely new framework for a cause of action regarding evictions and providing
an expedited route for landlords to evict drug offenders.' 88 The Act was arguably
an extension and ultimately an expansion of the third-party policing movement.
However, the Act also provided tenants with two important defenses, the latter
which is the focus of what this Article argues as the foundation for a "new
eviction jurisprudence."
The Act was drafted in direct response to President Clinton's "Community
Stabilization" papers published by the Commission on Model State Drug Laws.
Prior to the drafting of the Model State Drug Laws and the Rucker ruling, PHAs
did not strictly adhere to the One-Strike Rule and often used leniency in evicting
tenants who had no knowledge of the activity. However, an Executive Order
signed by President Clinton in 1996 encouraged PHAs to impose the One-Strike
policy more often and incentivized PHAs that did so with increased funding. The
Rucker decision, as discussed in Part II, only further exacerbated no-fault
evictions.

fraud, capricious action or abuse of power; they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into
the details of the manner adopted to carry them into execution. It is true that the mere possession of
discretionary power by an administrative body does not make it wholly immune from judicial review, but
the scope of that review is limited to the determination of whether there has been a manifest and flagrant
abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or functions. That the court
might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the agency is not a sufficient ground
for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative discretion." Id.
186. 816 A.2d 1099 (2003).
187. 908 A.2d 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
188. Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-176(a)(1) (2015).
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The Act was drafted and deliberated between June and December 1995
before a final vote. It was the quintessential third-party policing legislation for
controlling and preventing misconduct and crimes in residential housing.' 89 The
purpose of the Act was to empower prosecutors, neighborhood associations,
tenants and landlords, including PHAs, with the power to take civil action against
those known to engage in drug-related criminal activity. 190 The legislation sought
to empower "tenants to help themselves when it comes to dealing with drugs and
to try to root out some of [the] antisocial behavior that goes on in some of [the]
housing establishments.' 191 The police community also convinced legislators to
enact laws to shift the burden of policing crime and misconduct, while District
Attorneys in Pennsylvania have been pushing for increased third-party policing
since the legislation was enacted in 1995.192

State Senator Joseph Uliana of the 18th District preferred for the legislation
to "go beyond the remedies which [were] presently found in the law ... to allow

and empower tenants and people who live in public housing to get people out of
public housing who [were] .

.

. creating a menace and get them out of all public

housing units.' 9 3 The legislative intent seemed to suggest that legislators wanted
to "quicken the pace for drug evictions [because] public housing authorities
[were] unable to get evictions of individuals who [were] indicted for drug
trafficking and drug-related activities." 194 In other words, while the statute
applied to private landlord-tenant disputes, its primary target was public housing.
The Act enabled landlords, tenant organizations and neighbors to file
complaints directly to the Court of Common Pleas civil trial division and have an
eviction hearing scheduled fifteen days later. 195 Today, a bench trial ordinarily
determines whether the landlord has met his burden of proving that drug-related
criminal activity occurred on or within the apartment, whether the apartment was
used for drug-related criminal activity or the tenant or a guest engaged in the
activity on or in the immediate vicinity of the apartment. Quite simply, evidence
of drug-related activity may be enough to satisfy a complete eviction under the
Act.
Enumerated under 35 P.S. § 780-152, there are three primary sections of the
Act that serve as the legislative tools for PHAs to effectuate the One-Strike
Rule. 196 In addition, the PHA's model lease holds the tenant liable by prohibiting
189. See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 26, at 119 (quoting Michael Buerger & Lorraine
Mazerolle, Third PartyPolicing:A TheoreticalAnalysis of an Emerging Trend, 15 JUSTICE. QUARTERLY
301,303 (1998)).
190. See S. 41, 1st Sess., at 228 (Pa. 1995).
191. See H.R. 57, 1st Sess., at 385 (Pa. 1995).
192. Andrew Conte, Local landlordsfind it's not easy to evict drug dealers, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNEREVIEW, (Aug. 20, 2010), http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_695693.html#axzz3lTJLOXr; see
Desmond & Valdez, supra note 26, at 118.
193. See S. 41, supra note 187, at 231.
194. See S. 41, supra note 187, at 230.
195. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-164(a) (West 2015).
196. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-152 (West 2015) ("(2) Persons who commit drug distribution
offenses on or in the immediate vicinity of leased residential premises or who permit or tolerate such
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the tenant's household members, including guests, from engaging in "any drugrelated criminal activity on or off the Premises or in the Unit.', 197 Further, the

PHA model lease buttresses the Act and the federal regulations by stating that no
covered person, including a guest or family member, may engage in "any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment
of the Premises."' 198 In fact, several provisions, including the innocent tenant
defense, were "taken right out of' the papers published by the Commission on
Model State Drug Laws. 199 Two important tenant defenses feature in the
legislation: (1) innocent tenant defense and (2) serious injustice exemption.
1. Innocent Tenant Defense-35 P.S. § 780-157(a)
The Pennsylvania Legislature drafted an innocent tenant defense into the
Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers Act in 1995, in light of the unresolved
issues over whether Congress intended for the federal regulations to permit a nofault, strict-liability rule. 00 On the Pennsylvania House Floor during the drafting
of the Act, State Senator Jeffrey Piccola stated, "If [leaseholders] can persuade
the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that they are innocent, the court has
within its power under this proposed act the discretion to order a partial or

offenses to be committed violate the rights and jeopardize the health and safety of the other tenants,
residents and onsite employees of the premises. (3) It is the policy of the Commonwealth to ensure the
swift eviction and removal of persons who engage in certain drug-related criminal activity on or in the
immediate vicinity of leased residential premises or who permit members of their households or guests to
engage in this criminal activity on or in the vicinity of the premises ....
(5) It is the policy of the
Commonwealth to encourage landlords to protect the rights, safety and health of their tenants and
residents by promptly commencing and fully prosecuting civil eviction and removal proceedings against
those tenants and other persons who engage in drug-related criminal activity on or in the immediate
vicinity of their properties.").
197. See HOUS. AUTH. OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH, MODEL LEASE AGREEMENT 4 (2014), http://st
aticl .firemandev.info.s3 .amazonaws.com/galleries/general/HCV / 20Program%20ilnfonnation/ModelLe
aseAgreement - HCV.pdf
198. Id.
199. See H.R. 57, supra note 188, at 381; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MODEL STATE DRUG
LAWS, MODEL EXPEDITED EVICTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS ACT A-32 (1993) ("Thus, for example,
where the tenant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was innocent of the
drug-related criminal activity proven by the plaintiff, and that the person who actually committed the
activity no longer resides in his or her individual rental unit, then the appropriate relief would be the
issuance of the removal order directed against the specific drug-trafficker, and the establishment of a
'conditional tenancy' wherein the tenant would thereafter be required to reuse permission for re-entry to
the drug trafficker, and notify law enforcement or public housing authorities if the person does not return
to or re-enter the tenant's individual rental unit.").
200. S. Rep. No. 101-316, at 179 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5763, 5941.
Congressional intent regarding no-fault evictions was, arguably, to permit an innocent tenant defense.
The Senate report explained: "The committee anticipates that each case [eviction proceeding] will be
judged on its individual merits and will require the wise exercise of humane judgment by the PHA and
the eviction court. For example, eviction would not be the appropriate course if the tenant had no
knowledge of the criminal activities of his/her guests or had taken reasonable steps under the
circumstances to prevent the activity." Id.
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conditional tenancy or partial eviction so that the tenant is safeguarded from
eviction ... ,,201
The Pennsylvania Legislature wanted to allow a tenant to raise a defense that
would provide "adequate safeguards for an innocent tenant who is the victim of
their own co-tenant., 20 2 The innocent tenant defense, drafted into the Act, permits
a court to refrain from evicting a tenant if the tenant can show (1) that she did not
know or have reason to know that drug-related criminal activity was occurring on
or within the individual rental unit and (2) that she had done everything that
could reasonably be expected in the circumstances to prevent the commission of
the drug-related criminal activity. 20 3 But, while making a strong innocent victim
defense available, few cases have come before Pennsylvania appellate courts that
rely on the Act's innocent tenant defense.
In PhiladelphiaHousingAuthority v. Snyder,20 4 the tenant's son was arrested
outside the premises for drug-related criminal activity. The Philadelphia Housing
Authority (PHA) filed a complaint and petition for a preliminary injunction,
requesting the trial court evict Snyder, alleging that the tenant's action of
knowingly permitting her son to deal drugs violated the Expedited Eviction of
Drug Traffickers Act. The tenant asserted the affirmative defense under 35 P.S. §
780-157(a) arguing that she did not have knowledge of the criminal activity of
her son. But the Commonwealth Court reasoned that, even though the tenant
testified she did not know of the criminal activity, there was evidence that might
support a different conclusion, and thus remanded the case back to the trial
court.20 5 Indeed, the court reiterated that, "[i]t is not the province of this court to
201. See H.R. 57, supra note 188, at 381.
202. See id.
203. See 35 P.S. § 780-157(a) ("Affirmative defense. The court may refrain from ordering the
complete eviction of a tenant under section 6(a), if the tenant has established that the tenant was not
involved in the drug-related criminal activity and that the tenant (1) did not know or have reason to know
that drug-related criminal activity was occurring on or within the individual rental unit, that the
individual rental unit was used in any way in furtherance of or to promote drug-related criminal activity
or that any member of the tenant's household or any guest has engaged in drug-related criminal activity
on or in the immediate vicinity of any portion of the leased residential premises; (2) had done everything
that could reasonably be expected in the circumstances to prevent the commission of the drug-related
criminal activity; or (3) had promptly reported the drug-related criminal activity to appropriate law
enforcement authorities.").
204. 816 A.2d 377 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 2003).
205. Id. at 382. Some courts have ruled in favor of the tenant by applying the innocent tenant
defense under the Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers Act, however, what case law is available seems
confined to Section 8 tenants evicted for violating the One-Strike Rule. See, e.g., Woodland Manor
Apartments v. Flowers, 39 Pa. D. & C. 4th 202, 208 (Com. P1. 1998). In Flowers, the tenant's brother
was convicted of drug-related criminal activity inside the tenant's premises at Woodland Manor
Apartments. The tenant did not know of the presence of drugs or the paraphernalia in her apartment. In
fact, a testifying officer also had no reason to believe the tenant was part of the illegal activity. The tenant
lived in Section 8 project-based "new construction" housing, requiring the lease agreement between the
tenant and owner of the unit provide "any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises,
engaged in by a tenant of any unit, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person
under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Id. at 204 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii)). The court found that where a public housing tenant is not personally at fault, by
commission or omission, for the drug-related activity of a member of her household or guest, no good
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make credibility determinations, resolve conflicts in the evidence or make
findings of fact., 20 6 In other words, had the court found the testimony of the
tenant's lack of knowledge credible and made a determination based on the
innocent tenant defense, the appellate court would presumably not disturb the
trial court's determination, even if the court overturned a PHA's decision to
evict.
While 35 P.S. § 780-157(a) provided for an innocent tenant defense, House
Representative Allen Kukovich of the 56th District cautioned that the Legislature
would "be very sorry someday if all this legislation is signed into law" without
adequate safeguards from "undue hardships on innocent people., 207 The
Legislature, thus persuaded, incorporated a second, little-known, defense under
the Act to provide additional eviction safeguards and to alleviate fears that
serious injustices would result as a consequence of giving landlords too much
third-party policing power to evict. 208 Arguably, the statutory exemption was
inserted as a secondary safeguard if the innocent tenant defense failed on state
substantive law grounds.
2. The Statutory Exemption-35 P.S. § 780-157(b)
The statutory exemption is an alternative eviction defense for a tenant under
the Act. The exemption was drafted into the Act to provide "adequate safety
valves in which to avoid injustices if such a case [could] be made out., 20 9 The
intent of the Pennsylvania Legislature was to ensure that debilitating hardships
caused by unjust evictions would be "more than adequately taken care of under
the exemption section of [the] statute" giving sufficient discretion to trial courts
to avoid injustices. 210 The statutory exemption, under 35 P.S. § 780-157(b),
states:
If the grounds for a complete eviction have been established, the
court shall order the eviction of the tenant unless, having regard
to the circumstances of the criminal activity and the condition of
the tenant, the court is clearly convinced that immediate eviction
or removal would effect a serious injustice the prevention of
which overrides the need to protect the rights, safety and health

cause exists for termination of the lease and eviction. Id. at 208. The court cited 35 P.S. § 780-151 etseq.
to reason that the innocent tenant defense under 35 P.S. § 780-157(a) was consistent with the legislative
history of the Housing Act and clarifies the legislature's intent with respect to the effect of the Landlord
and Tenant Act. Id.
206. Id.
207. See H.R. 57, supra note 188, at 384

208. Id. at 381.
209. Id. at 385.
210. Id. at 382.
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of the other tenants and residents of the leased residential
premises.2 1'
Indeed, the legislators, and in particular the drafters, of the Act were well aware
that it was necessary for the legislation to equip trial courts with discretion to
review eviction matters because each tenant's individual circumstance in an
eviction proceeding is different and that each case has its own unique
peculiarities. 212 On the House Floor in September 1995, House Representative
William R. Lloyd, Jr. of the 69th District voiced his concern about the extent to
which landlords could evict under the statute, posing the following hypothetical
to the House Speaker, Matthew Ryan:
A child 16 years old lives with his parents in an apartment
complex and is doing drugs. The parents do not want to call the
police; they want to help their child get well. They try over the
course of a year or so to get that child into a proper drug
treatment program, without success. Ultimately, the child gets
arrested and gets convicted or gets probation, but gets into a
drug-treatment program; now 2 or 3 years later is pronounced by
the system to be cured; wants to come back home and live at the
parents' apartment. Under your explanation and reading
of the
213
permitted?
be
that
would
code,
model
the
on
comments
Senator Piccola responded to Representative Lloyd, redirecting him to the serious
injustice exemption, saying "Clearly, the scenario you have painted, a drug-free
life where rehabilitation has been sought and successfully obtained, would fall
under that section and allow the court not to order either partial or complete
eviction or immediate eviction under the statute., 21 4 But Representative Allen
Kukovich of the 56th District voiced his concern that the "bill is silent as to what
would happen after [tenants] would be removed" and that certain provisions
would "tear families apart.", 21 5 While this was not the "intention" of the
Legislature, Representatives Kukovich and Lloyd were rightly concerned that "in
the rush to pass some of [the] legislation" the members of the Legislature needed
to be thoughtful
in drafting the provisions that would guard against unjust
21 6
evictions.
Nonetheless, the intent of the Legislature was to provide a statutory
exemption that authorized trial courts to exercise broad discretion when deciding
an eviction matter and to take into account, among other things, the offender's
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

35 P.S. § 780-157(b) (emphasis added).
See S. 41, supra note 187, at 230.
See H.R. 57, supra note 188, at 382.
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id.
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efforts to rehabilitate himself and consider the lapse of time between the offense
and the eviction. This seems to be buttressed by Representative Lloyd's inquiry
as to whether there was a requirement that the eviction action begin within some
specified period of time after the drug-related activity occurred' 2 17 to which
Senator Piccola affirmed that the intent of the legislation was not to incorporate a
sunset provision for when a landlord can bring an eviction action after the drugrelated criminal activity has occurred.218
In other words, the legislative history reveals that the Legislature, perhaps
unknowingly, had carved out an exemption that indirectly attacks 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(1)(6) and the Rucker ruling. It is clear that the exemption statute, by
legislative design, was intentionally placed into the statute to safeguard tenants
from landlords, such as PHAs, who may abuse third-party policing power and
fail to take into account all the circumstances of the criminal activity and the
condition of the tenant when moving to evict a tenant on grounds of drug-related
criminal activity. It is less clear, however, how courts interpret and treat the
exemption statute since only one case is available that makes short shrift of the
provision.
In Housing Authority ofPittsburghv. Underwood, the tenant's son, who was
a named person on the lease, was arrested for drug-related criminal activity in
2011.219 The Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh moved to evict under
the statute, asserting that the tenant violated her lease agreement because a
member of her household engaged in drug-related criminal activity in the
immediate vicinity of her residence. The tenant had attempted to remove her son
from the premises multiple times prior to the criminal conviction, but had failed
to remove his name from the lease. The tenant argued, on appeal, that the trial
court abused its discretion in rejecting the affirmative defense under 35 P.S. §
780-157(a)(1). 220 She argued she did not have knowledge of the drug-related
criminal activity, that she no longer permitted her son on the premises, and that
she had attempted to remove him.
The tenant also argued, in conjunction with the innocent tenant defense, that
the trial court erred in failing to find that the tenant fell within the exemption
under 35 P.S. § 780-157(b). The tenant argued that there was nothing in the
record showing that she or her other two children could have posed a threat to the
rights, safety, and health of the other tenants and residents of the leased
residential property, because it was her other son-over whom she had no
control-who had engaged in the criminal activity. 221 Further, the tenant argued
that a 26-year tenure as a public housing resident, along with the fact that the
tenant and her children did not pose a threat, was sufficient for the court to find
217. Id. at 382.
218. Id.
219. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh v. Underwood, No. 2151 C.D. 2011, 2012 WL 8702756, at *1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Aug. 9, 2012).
220. Id. at *2.
221. Id. at *1.
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that eviction would result in a serious injustice overriding the rights, safety, and
health of the other tenants.222
The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, awarding the
Housing Authority of the City Pittsburgh (HACP) possession of the housing unit
pursuant to the Act. 223 The court, although sympathetic, found that there was no
evidence establishing that the tenant's eviction would result in a serious injustice
overriding the need to protect others; and the tenant's testimony lacked
credibility. Importantly, however, the ruling was based on a trial decision that
was adverse to the tenant. It is likely that an appellate court would uphold a trial
court decision to deny the eviction if the court was clearly convinced the eviction
would cause a serious injustice. But no such case has come before an appellate
court in Pennsylvania; thus, the statutory exemption sits in a legal vacuum at the
appellate level.
B. North Carolina'sMorris Four-ProngTest
The evolution towards a "new eviction jurisprudence" in North Carolina has
its origins in a decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court, Morris v.
Austraw.224 In Morris, the court decided that the particular lease in dispute did
not have sufficient language to support forfeiture when applied to the facts.225
The court, peculiarly, pulled an influential quote from American Jurisprudenceto
create an unconscionability factor, which stated the "right to declare a forfeiture
of a lease must be distinctly reserved; the proof of the happening of the event on
which the right is to be exercised must be clear; the party entitled to do so must
exercise his right promptly; and the result of enforcing the forfeiture must not be
unconscionable." 226 This seemingly harmless reference to American
Jurisprudencehas evolved into a major point of contestation amongst landlords
and tenants in contemporary eviction law.
1. The Unconscionability Rule
The quote seems to assert a general principle of law. But it also, arguably,
can be interpreted as dicta. Of course, dicta is not binding precedent and courts
222. Id. at *3.
223. Id. at *4.
224. 152 S.E.2d 155 (1967).

225. See Morris, 152 S.E.2d at 158 59.
226. Morris, 152 S.E.2d at 159 (quoting 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, § 848, at 720 21 (1941))
("Generally, unless there is an express stipulation for a forfeiture, the breach of a covenant in a lease does
not work a forfeiture of the tenn. Moreover, the settled principle of both law and equity that contractual
provisions for forfeitures are looked upon with disfavor applies with full force to stipulations for
forfeitures found in leases; such stipulations are not looked upon with favor by the court, but on the
contrary are strictly construed against the party seeking to invoke them. As has been said, the right to
declare a forfeiture of a lease must be distinctly reserved; the proof of the happening of the event on
which the right is to be exercised must be clear; the party entitled to do so must exercise his right
promptly; and the result of enforcing the forfeiture must not be unconscionable.").
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have the discretion to apply the language used by prior court rulings in present
matters, but it does give a fuller understanding of the court's reasoning and logic
in making a determination. North Carolina courts have followed suit with the
Morris ruling, creating a four-prong test for evictions that is today probably
considered a general principle of law. Most notably, a state appellate court in
Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming laid out the four-prong test, citing
Morris:
In order to evict a tenant in North Carolina, a landlord must
prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to
declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is
clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the
landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the
landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and
(4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not
unconscionable 227
After reviewing eviction cases under the four-prong test, the North Carolina
General Assembly amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26 to state that the "plaintiff
proves his case by a preponderance of the evidence",, 228 But other rulings, such as
that in Durham Hosiery Mill Ltd. Partnership v. Morris,22 9 found that the
language in Morris was "clearly dicta because it was unnecessary to the
resolution of the case" and that neither "Austraw nor Fleming created a
heightened burden of persuasion for plaintiffs in summary ejectment cases.,230
The Court in Durham Hosiery concluded that "[T]he Supreme Court did not
purport to adopt this language and announce it as the law of North Carolina with
this quotation. ,23 1 Instead, the Court reasoned that the Supreme Court introduced
the quotation by stating, "This is said in 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant § 848.
S.,,232 Thus, the Court in Durham Hosiery concluded the Supreme Court's
decision in Austraw [Morris] "did not modify the burden of persuasion
for
233
establishing a breach of a lease provision in summary ejectment actions.,
The confusion over the reach of the Morris test goes further, particularly
regarding the unconscionability rule. In Maxton HousingAuthority v. McLean,234
the North Carolina Supreme Court extended the Patterson decision by stating
that there was no "good cause" for terminating a public housing tenant's lease
agreement because the tenant was not at fault for the nonpayment of rent. The
227. Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C. App. 1996) (citing Alorris, 152
S.E.2d at 159).
228. See Ch. 10, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 5.
229. 720 S.E.2d 426, 429 (N.C. App. 2011).
230. Durham Hosiery Mill Ltd. Partnership, 720 S.E.2d at 429.
231. Id. at 429.
232. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Id.
234. 328 S.E.2d 290 (1985).
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Maxton Court stated "[t]here is no causal nexus between the eviction of [tenant]
and her own conduct .

. .

. To eject [tenant] and her two children from their

humble abode upon this evidence would indeed shock one's sense of fairness. ,,211
However, since the decision, the North Carolina Legislature has restricted the
Maxton decision only to evictions regarding non-payment of rent.236 Until
recently in Lofton, discussed below, there was no precedent dealing specifically
with a subsidized eviction where the issue in question was whether the landlord
proved that eviction on the grounds of drug-related criminal activity would not be
unconscionable as set forth under the fourth prong. The application of the serious
injustice exemption in Somerville and the unconscionability rule of the fourprong test in Lofton has upended the post-Rucker normal state of affairs.
V. TOWARDS A NEW EVICTION JURISPRUDENCE
By drawing out several themes and concepts from the sociological literature
on evictions, material hardship, and housing instability, we can unpack what is
useful and perhaps groundbreaking about the new eviction jurisprudence
proposed in this Article. Indeed, by narrowing the scope of attention of evictions
and housing on a population at heightened risk of eviction-low-income mothers
living in public housing-we can more forcefully argue the necessity for trial
courts to be equipped with more, not less, discretion to deny a One-Strike Rule
eviction that leads to serious injustices or unconscionable consequences.
A. Housing Authority ofPittsburgh v. Somerville
The tenant in Housing Authority ofPittsburghv. Somerville237 had longed to
move out of Arlington Heights, a neighborhood in the southern area of the City
of Pittsburgh. The neighborhood, like many others in midsize American cities,
had been dealt the blow of deindustrialization and poverty associated with the
growth of the urban underclass over the last half-Century. 238 Arlington Heights,
historically, has had relatively high rates of poverty and is home to one of the
city's many public housing projects. 23 9 The history of the neighborhood could
235. Alaxton, 328 S.E.2d at 294.
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 157-29 (West).
237. Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh v. Somerville, No. GD 14-7207, 2014 WL 7734105 (Pa. Com. P1.
Dec. 8, 2014).
238. William Haller, Industrial Restructuring and Urban Change in the Pittsburgh Region:
Developmental, Ecological, and Socioeconomic Tradeoffs, 10.1 ECOLOGY. & SOC'Y. 13 (2005)
(examining structural changes and transitions of the steel industry with other industries and focusing on
the socioeconomic and structural changes on increases in persistent joblessness and poverty associated
with growth of the urban underclass).
239. Id. Arlington Heights has a history of being an area of extreme poverty. In Pittsburgh, the areas
of extreme poverty ran from downtown, through the Hill District and into West Oakland, which includes
parts of the downtown, Crawford-Roberts, Terrace Village, and West Oakland and Arlington Heights. Id.
at 18. These areas also exhibited increases in the other manifestations of the underclass, including
unemployment, crime, deviant behavior, out-of-wedlock births, etc. Id.
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arguably be described as an example of the deep spatial isolation and
concentration of the "ghetto poor.,,240
In Somerville, the tenant was convicted of felony drug offenses in March
2012 for activity that occurred outside of the public housing unit. The Housing
Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (HACP) did not learn of the conviction until
almost three years later, in April 2014, while reviewing the tenant's Section 8
application. The PHA was required 24to1 conduct a criminal background check as
part of the review of the application. As a result, the tenant was denied Section
8 assistance based on the criminal conviction. Only six days later, the PHA filed
a complaint under the Expedited Eviction
of Drug Traffickers Act to terminate
242
the tenant's public housing assistance.
At trial, the tenant offered evidence that two and a half years lapsed since the
prior conviction and was buttressed by evidence of rehabilitation. 243 The trial
record was also supplemented with after-discovered evidence prior to the posttrial relief argument to show that the tenant had become pregnant sometime in
late-May or early-June. An eviction after two and a half years of rehabilitation
would render an unfair result and pose a risk to increased material hardship,
particularly if the tenant was rendered homeless with no shelter while
simultaneously attempting to care for her unborn child.

240. See DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 10 (1993); XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF

OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 7 (2005) (discussing the

geography of opportunity and how urban sprawl contributes to continued segregation and concentration
of the urban poor); see also KARYN R. LACY, BLUE CHIP BLACK: RACE, CLASS AND STATUS IN THE
NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 21 (2007) (focusing on the impact of differences in residential location on
the construction of identity for middle-class African-Americans). See generally WWLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 7

(1987) (analyzing the effects of the exodus of working class families from the inner city and the causes of
social dislocation); ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 20 30 (2012) (theorizing that there is a social component to enduring
neighborhood inequality in that people react to neighborhood difference).
241. See 24 C.F.R. 960.204(a)(4). The tenant had applied for Section 8 housing two years prior to
her drug arrest in 2010. Her application awaited review in the notoriously lengthy waitlist until April
2014 when the PHA pulled her application from the waitlist for review. See Somerville, 2014 WL
7734105, at *1
242. Somerville, 2014 WL 7734105, at *1. At the same time, the tenant exercised her right to a
grievance hearing, under federal regulations, to have her Section 8 application reviewed by a third-party
arbitrator in late-April and was scheduled for a grievance hearing in late May 2014. Id.
243. The trial court relied, in part, on the testimony of the tenant at trial. Judge O'Reilly deemed
"worthy of consideration" the tenant's own statement: "As far as the person who wasn't allowed to be
staying with me, he was my boyfriend, and he would come up from time to time. Once I was made aware
that he wasn't allowed to be on Housing Authority property, that's when I started getting into it with him
about him coming to my house. That's where other trouble came from. So it was more so me trying to
prevent anything further from happening, him not being allowed or whatever. So I would say I
responsibly handled that. But as far as the eviction, due to my record, it's been two years and I've been
out of trouble. I haven't been in any trouble. I haven't dealt with any drugs. I've worked. Well, I did two
internships last summer, and I'm currently waiting to start my Wal-Mart training. So, you know, I'm
trying to get back on the right path. I've been trying to get back on the right path, and I just would like an
actual opportunity to do so." Somerville, 2014 WL 7734105, at *2.
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Further, the record was supplemented with additional after-discovered
evidence of the PHA's denial of the tenant's Section 8 application, and
subsequent overruling of the denial, on the grounds of the tenant's prior criminal
activity. 244 Under federal regulations, a public assistance applicant may request a
grievance hearing when a Section 8 application has been denied. At the informal
grievance hearing, an officer (attorney) assigned by the PHA heard testimony and
took evidence from the tenant that was the same, or substantially the same, as
that proffered at the bench trial.245
The hearing officer overruled the PHA's denial and instead approved the
tenant's Section 8 subsidy notwithstanding the prior criminal conviction,
concluding that enough time had lapsed and that the tenant's good standing and
progress showed adequate rehabilitation.246 The hearing officer's decision
showed that a separate, neutral tribunal had exercised nearly the identical
reasoning to approve the tenant's Section 8 public assistance notwithstanding the
prior criminal conviction. Thus, the inclusion of the Section 8 approval in the
trial records, notwithstanding the conviction, had the effect of strengthening the
court's reliance on the exemption statute, leading the court to determine that the
same evidence was sufficient to deny eviction and termination of the tenant's
public assistance. The PHA action to evict amounted to trying for a second bite at
the apple.247
244. Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Record with After-Discovered Evidence, Hous. Auth.
of Pittsburgh v. Somerville, No. GD 14-7207, 2014 WL 7734105 (Pa. Com. P1. Dec. 8, 2014).
245. Recent case law in Pennsylvania has strengthened the grievance hearing process, including
appeals from adverse decisions that deny applicants subsidized housing. In Bray v. McKeesport Hous.
Auth., 114 A.3d 442, 453 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015), the Commonwealth Court held that a PHA's
determination to deny or approve a public housing applicant is akin to having tenant's property rights and
thus was an "adjudication" subject to judicial review. The case overruled longstanding precedent in Cope
v. Bethlehem Hous. Auth., 514 A.2d 295 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). Indeed, the court acknowledged that
applicants for public housing have a legitimate expectation that their applications will be fully considered
and not unfairly denied. Therefore, the applicants have a cognizable property interest in having their
applications considered in accordance with guidelines set forth under local and federal regulations, and
such decisions are subject to appellate review pursuant to 2 PA. STAT. ANN. § 752 (West 2015).
246. See Defendant's Brief in Response at 9, Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh v. Somerville, No. GD 147207, 2014 WL 7734105 (Pa. Com. P1. Dec. 8, 2014). At the Section 8 grievance hearing, held May 28,
2014, the officer reviewed the tenant's application, and notwithstanding the criminal conviction,
overturned PHA's Section 8 application denial and, instead, approved the Section 8 application.
Significantly, the hearing officer's reasons for approving the Section 8 application at the grievance
hearing were nearly identical in substance as the trial court's decision to deny the eviction of the tenant a
few weeks earlier. The hearing officer stated that (1) the tenant completed two internships at the Student
Conservation Association; (2) completed probation for the 2012 criminal conviction; (3) acknowledged
that the criminal conviction was an isolated conviction that occurred two and half years ago; and (4)
Defendant had otherwise rehabilitated herself. An argument for collateral estoppel was made in the
Defendant's Brief in Response because the housing authority, arguably, was re-litigating the same issue
that had already been decided in a prior action; that is, the Section 8 grievance hearing office approved
the Section 8 public assistance in light of the prior criminal activity and the trial court had denied the
termination of public housing assistance in light of the prior criminal activity. However, the trial court
only mentioned, but did not elaborate on, the collateral estoppel.
247. Kim Lyons, Teaming up to help Pittsburgh-areatenants in public housing eviction cases,
PITTSBURGH. POST-GAZETTE, (Jun. 26, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/2015/06/28/
Teaming-up-to-help-Pittsburgh-area-tenants-in-public-housing-eviction-cases/stories/201506260031.
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The trial court's opinion unveils an eloquent application of the exemption
statute that significantly strengthens and further clarifies the discretion entrusted
to the judiciary by the Pennsylvania Legislature. Indeed, the trial court reviewed
"the circumstances of the criminal activity" and holistically considered the
"condition of the tenant" when determining whether it was "clearly convinced"
that the immediate eviction or removal would "[a]ffect a serious injustice. ,,248

The trial court stated:
Somerville was a qualified candidate for the above consideration
[statutory exemption]. The record shows that she had
acknowledged her crime, pled guilty and successfully served her
18-month probation. Further, she had concluded her probation
well before HACP did anything to evict her. Indeed over 6
months had elapsed since completion of the probation and over 2
years from the date of the actual crime and her guilty plea. I find
this delay to be indicative of her nonthreatening character and
life style .... In my judgment, however, it would be a serious

injustice to her to evict her when significant time has elapsed and
she appears to be on the right track. This is buttressed by the
after-discovered evidence that she is pregnant and had been
certified for Section 8 housing notwithstanding her conviction.
Counsel for HACP also argued that the standard for me to have
done what I did requires clear and convincing evidence.
Evidence of what? Presumably it is evidence that I am clearly
convinced that her eviction would result in a serious injustice as
set out in the statute.249

The exemption was inserted into the legislation to protect tenants from unjust
evictions where "such a case can be made out. '250 Indeed, the Somerville ruling is
an example of precisely the type of eviction case that the Legislature hoped the
exemption would protect. The burden of proof for the affirmative defense of a
serious injustice was clear and convincing evidence. 251 The trial court stated that
its standard of review is whether the court is "clearly convinced that her eviction
would result in a serious injustice as set out in the statute. 252
The "clear and convincing evidence" standard thus falls somewhere between
the "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" standards.
The court did not adhere to the traditional abuse of discretion standard. The
Somerville case lays the groundwork for what will inevitably be a clash between
248. Somerville, 2014 WL 7734105, at *1.
249. Id. at*l 2.
250. See H.R. 57, supra note 188 at 375.
251. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-157(c) (West 2015) ("The burden of proof for the affirmative
defense set forth in subsection (b) shall be by clear and convincing evidence.").
252. Somerville, 2014 WL 7734105, at *1.
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the statutory exemption under 35 P.S. § 780-157(b) and the federal regulation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1). This clash is inevitable because the HACP, in
response to the ruling, appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
The case was later discontinued by the HACP when the tenant preempted the
terminated lease agreement once she found alternative housing using, ironically,
her Section 8 voucher. On appeal, the HACP had raised two legal issues that hint
at a forthcoming preemption argument the next time the statutory exemption is
raised by a tenant and relied upon by a trial court. 253 At the post-trial relief
hearing, the HACP's reply brief responding to the defendant's brief in response
concluded that "even the most liberal reading of this requirement [that there must
be compelling evidence of a federal intention to preempt a state law], it is
obvious that a federal program on housing (HUD) and federal tax dollars, are
compelling evidence of the intention to preempt., 254 The Somerville ruling,
nonetheless, has provided some much needed judicial interpretation of the
statute.
The material hardship facing the tenant in Somerville is worth noting. The
fallout of eviction for the tenant, who was expecting her first child, would have
likely thrown her into a downward spiral of homelessness, contributing to health
problems during prenatal care and throughout the course of her pregnancy,
thereby threatening the health of her child. Further, an eviction on her record
would likely make her Section 8 voucher superfluous when participating Section
8 landlords found not only her conviction, but her eviction record, upon
conducting a background check. As sociologists have predicted, the year
following eviction can prove difficult for poor women with children. The
statutory exemption helped avoid such consequences.
B. Eastern CarolinaRegional Housing Authority v. Lofton
In Eastern CarolinaRegional Housing Authority v. Lofton,255 the tenant was
a mother with three minor children. The tenant was a habilitation technician
253. See Superior Court of Pennsylvania Civil Docketing Statement, 55 WDA 2015 (Jan. 3, 2015).
The HACP raised the issues (1) The trial court erred in not evicting the tenant under 35 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 780-157(b) (West 2015) when the HACP had proven that the tenant had engaged in drug-related
criminal activity and there was no applicable exception; and (2) the trial court erred by finding evidence
of a serious injustice overriding the need to protect the rights, safety and health of the other residents. The
appeal was later discontinued when it was discovered that the tenant had successfully leased an
alternative apartment using her Section 8 voucher that had been approved and distributed to the tenant
months earlier while eviction proceedings were ongoing. See Superior Court of Pennsylvania Notice of
Discontinuation, 55 WDA 2015 (Feb. 11, 2015).
254. See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Brief in Response at 6, Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh v.
Somerville, No. GD 14-7207, 2014 WL 7734105 (Pa. Com. P1. Dec. 8, 2014).
255. 767 S.E.2d 63 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). The tenant's boyfriend regularly baby-sat the tenant's
children. In April 2013, while caring for the children, the tenant's friend was arrested on the premises for
drug possession. The tenant was home at the time, but was sleeping upstairs to get rest before her work
shift started later that evening. The tenant subsequently authorized the officers to search the entire
apartment, and the police found more drugs in the kitchen. The drugs belonged to the tenant's friend and
the tenant was not charged with any crime.
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working with persons with mental illnesses. The tenant's mother and niece
periodically served as babysitters for her children when she went to work.
However, after the tenant moved to public housing, her mother and niece were no
longer available to babysit. As a result, the tenant relied upon her boyfriend, who
started to baby-sit the tenant's children regularly.
In April 2013, while caring for the children, the tenant's boyfriend was
arrested on the premises for drug possession.2 56 The tenant was home at the time,
but was sleeping upstairs before her work shift started later that evening.257 The
tenant subsequently authorized the officers to search the entire apartment, and the
police found more drugs in the kitchen. 258 The drugs belonged
to the tenant's
25 9
boyfriend and the tenant was not charged with any crime.
The PHA commenced eviction proceedings on the grounds of drug-related
criminal activity. 260 26The
district magistrate court found in favor of the PHA and
ordered possession. 1 The tenant appealed, arguing that the magistrate failed to
consider her lack of control over her friend and lack of knowledge of his
activities. 262 The tenant primarily argued the fourth prong of the Morris teSt.263
The court in Lofton found that the PHA did not meet the fourth prong by
failing to show eviction would not be unconscionable. 264 The court
acknowledged "neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have defined the
circumstances under which it would or would not be unconscionable for a
landlord to summarily eject a tenant who was otherwise subject to eviction., 265 In
an effort to arrive at a rational interpretation of the language, the court defined
unconscionability to mean "'excessive, unreasonable' or 'shockingly unfair and
unjust.' 266 The court reasoned that, since the tenant was not charged with a
crime and the police accepted her denial of involvement, it would be
unconscionable" to evict her and her young children when the evidence was
clear that she had no involvement whatsoever in the events that transpired the
day her boyfriend was arrested. By not giving "any consideration to any of the
surrounding facts and circumstances that tended to mitigate, if not completely
excuse, her conduct in allowing [the boyfriend] to enter the premises," the
magistrate court erred in ordering the ejectment and affirmed the trial courts
denial of summary judgment and denial of the landlord's request to summarily

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 65.
Id.
Lofton, 767 S.E.2d at 65.
Id. at 65 66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67 (citing Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996)).
Lofton, 767 S.E. 2d at 68.
Id.
Id.
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evict the tenant.267 Indeed, the court eloquently applied the unconscionable
provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-26(a)(2):
After analyzing the totality of the surrounding facts and
circumstances, we have no hesitation in concluding that evicting
Defendant based solely upon the actions of Mr. Smith, of which
Defendant had no knowledge and which she had done nothing to
encourage or even tolerate when doing so would put Defendant
and her three small children "on the street," would be
"excessive" and "shockingly unfair or unjust" and that Plaintiff
has not, for that reason, established that summarily ejecting
Defendant from the apartment would not produce an
unconscionable result. 268
The court further set aside the PHA's preemption argument. The PHA argued
that existence of a strict liability rule could not be reconciled with a prohibition
against unconscionable evictions and that by relying on the provision the trial
court made it impossible to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) because there
was little distinction between the innocent tenant defense rejected in Rucker and
N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-26(a)(2). 269 Further, the court pointed out that the facts in
Lofton went beyond the typical "innocent tenant" situation and that, given all the
circumstances of the criminal incident and the condition of the tenant-losing her
job because she lacked a babysitter and having three young children-the court,
like the Somerville court, was convinced that the landlord had not shown how the
eviction would not be unconscionable.
The court reasoned that awareness, or lack thereof, of the criminal activity
ongoing on the premises is "one aspect of a broader unconscionability analysis
that would not, in each and every instance, preclude the eviction of an 'innocent'
tenant., 270 Thus, the statute gave discretion, particularly where the tenant was
unaware of criminal activity, for a court to deny an eviction and did not stand as
an obstacle to the goals set forth in the federal regulations. In other words, the
North Carolina court upheld the discretion authorized to the trial court under
N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-26(a)(2) to apply the unconscionability prong, even if the
decision overrules the decision of an administrative agency.2 7' Indeed, North
Carolina courts, and other state courts, "do not look with favor on lease
forfeitures. 272 The sociological literature finding grave consequences for poor,
single mother heads of household upon eviction, similarly, does not look
favorably on lease terminations as well.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See Lofton, 767 S.E.2d at 68.
Lofton, 767 S.E.2d at 68.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539 (1988).
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C. Chartinga Coursefor a New Eviction Jurisprudence
1. The Doctrine
Under a new eviction doctrine, contributing to a new eviction jurisprudence,
trial courts would apply a heightened standard of review to summary proceedings
against subsidized tenants on the grounds of drug-related activity. The evictor
would have to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that eviction would not
lead to serious injustices or unconscionable results, such as material hardships,
housing instability or other aspects of a broader analysis. This new doctrine
would not bar One-Strike evictions; it would effectively restrict them when
involuntary removal would clearly be unjust as determined by the trial court.
Currently, the civil burden of proof-preponderance of the evidence-is not
adequately responding to rapidly changing private and public housing instability
for the poor in light of the sociological research evidencing disproportionate
impacts on low-income single mothers. The current standard is simply illequipped to handle One-Strike eviction proceedings that, inherently, involve
criminal conduct.
It is not difficult to conceive a heightened standard of review in eviction
proceedings. The Supreme Court has engaged the clear and convincing standard
of proof in other similarly situated proceedings, including termination of parents'
custody of children and involuntary commitments of those to mental hospitals.273
This approach, informed by recent sociological literature of the fallout of
eviction, may help convey to trial courts reviewing summary evictions the level
of subjective certainty about the courts conclusions. It also strikes a fair and
balanced approach to the rights of the tenant and her household and the
legitimate concerns of the proliferation of drugs in public housing.
The clear and convincing standard could be overcome where the PHA takes
into consideration the nature of the criminal offense, the condition of the tenant,
and the consequences the tenant faces upon forced removal. A doctrine that
requires heightened review of PHA's eviction decisions is justified and may go a
long way in preventing increased material hardship and housing instability for an
extremely vulnerable class of public assistance recipients. PHAs would need to
show that the eviction would not lead to injustices and would be required to
provide more thorough and compelling justification for removal than simply a
finding of drug-related activity.
A new eviction jurisprudence requires more than empathy and understanding
from the bench. This jurisprudence will require trial court rulings to fill the gaps
273. Santosky v. Kramer 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391 (1982) (holding that due process requires a state to
prove "its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence" when initiating an action to terminate
parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding standard in commitment for
mental illness must inform the fact finder that proof must be greater than the preponderance of evidence
standard applicable to other categories of civil cases, and that clear and convincing evidence is an
adequate standard of review).

No. 1]

Towards a New Eviction Jurisprudence

in statutory provisions with rulings that strengthen and further conceptualize
what a "serious injustice" and "unconscionability" means. It is arguably the role
of courts to read further into a piece of legislation where such legislation lacks
jurisprudential precedent and its terms lack definitional guidance.2
2. Subsidized Households Headed by Poor Women with Children
The Somerville and Lofton courts strengthened the notion that PHAs have to
prove more than just criminal activity. And when they do not, courts will
intervene to deny summary ejectments or evictions. With clearly delineated
constitutional protection of property rights in public housing tenancies, tenants
most directly impacted by unjust evictions need a heightened eviction standard.
Indeed, this new eviction jurisprudence gives special considerations for the
constitutional protections of property afforded to groups most vulnerable to the
One-Strike Rule: households headed by poor women with children.
It is not difficult to see such special considerations being implicitly invoked
under the serious injustice exemption and the unconscionability rule because
those most impacted by the One-Strike Rule campaign are "poor single minority
female heads of households, often senior citizens, who are living with their actual
or adopted offspring ....,,275
Indeed, mothers and grandmothers are generally
innocent and often even ignorant of any criminal activity. 276 However, they are
nonetheless held responsible and, ultimately, disproportionately burdened with
the fallout effects of eviction, pushing them into extreme social and economic
vulnerability. Poor single female heads of households, often senior citizens or
younger women, become embattled in an eviction proceeding that usually starts
with an arrest or conviction of an adolescent
or young adult male child or
27 7
grandchild who is selling or possessing drugs.
The tenants in Somerville and Lofton were no exceptions. Beyond being an
unfair punitive policy for public housing tenants, the One-Strike Rule has been
viewed by some scholars as an "assault" on the values of women who ordinarily
take a protectionist approach to caring for their children, including using the
home as a safeguard from contact with drugs. 278 Lofton lost her job and
subsequently lost access to childcare once she found a new job. Of course, her

274. Edward Lazarus, Overall, The Aliers Nomination Is Troubling But It Does Have One Virtue,
FINDLAW (Oct. 13, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20051013.html
("All significant
legislation is riddled with gaps that need to be filled in by courts. While judges are guided in their
"interstitial" lawmaking function by what they perceive to be the intent of the legislature, it is
disingenuous to suggest that judges do not add content to the frameworks provided by legislatures.
Judges, of course, don't write new law on a blank page, but they do write important law between the lines
of what legislatures have already written.").
275. Regina Austin, Step on a Crack, Break Your Mfother' Back: Poor Aloms, Avlyths ofAuthority,
and Drug-RelatedEvictionsfrom Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEM. 273, 275 76 (2002).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 275.
278. Id. at 286.
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main priority was to keep her children safe by seeking a babysitter. Thankfully,
her boyfriend was able and willing to do the job. Stereotypical biases, however,
all too often "keep PHAs from exercising' 279their discretion in favor of these
tenants even when they are clearly innocent. ,
Indeed, the standards placed upon leaseholders by PHAs to take control of
the home and to reinforce non-drug-related activity disproportionately penalizes
single, particularly African American, women. PHAs often "fail to take into
consideration the reasons why a woman may remain silent or fall short of a
courts' standard for assertiveness in the face of a partner or family member's
drug-related criminal activity." 280 The courts' standard of assertiveness imposed
on the tenant, of course, is tantamount to a request to engage in the third-party
policing tactics that have unfairly targeted the urban poor. The PHAs' solution,
when households headed by women fail to successfully third-party police her
home, is to resort to the easy and efficient no-fault, One-Strike, eviction policy.
There are many factors that contribute to a single mother remaining in public
housing, such as domestic violence, economic dependence, or a disability that, by
nature, requires support from others in the neighborhood or family to assess
medical care and to help out with other responsibilities.28i PHAs and courts,
however, have long ignored the strong social and familial ties that public housing
residents enjoy just to get by. Grandmothers have even been drafted as the culprit
class of victims of the One-Strike Rule.282
Among those most vulnerable to eviction are innocent grandmothers.28 3
Recall the Rucker decision, where three of the four plaintiffs were either elderly
or grandmothers caring for grandchildren, one of whom was disabled. The OneStrike rule makes innocent tenants, particularly elderly residents, fearful and
anxious and potentially threatens their lives. 284 Courts have portrayed
grandmothers in eviction proceedings as "almost overwhelmed by the problems
279. See Melissa Cohen, Vindicating the Afatriarch: A Fair HousingAct Challenge to FederalNoFaultEvictions from Public Housing, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 306 (2009 10). Regina Austin
argues that the policy is motivated by a desire to "control the behavior of the stereotypical welfare mother
who is full of excuses for her progeny and always ready to overlook their shortcomings where drugs are
concerned, out of an abundance of misguided materialism." See Austin, supra note 94, at 286. Main N.
Morrison argues that an explicit motive to stereotype black mothers is a primary reason for imposing the
One-Strike Rule and that two competing stereotypes drive this policy. First, black women are presumed
to have knowledge of their children's drug use and are powerless to fix it. Second, black women are
presumed to be strong matriarchs who have knowledge of and are intimately involved in the drug-related
activity. See Main N. Morrison, The Knowledge/Power Dilemma and the Myth of the Supermother: A
Critique of the Innocent Owner Defense in Narcotics Forfeiture of the Family Home, 7 COLUM. J.
GENDER& L. 55,59 (1997).
280. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., CAUGHT IN THE NET THE IMPACT OF DRUG POLICIES
ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES 37 38 (2005).
281. Id.
282. Michael A. Cavanagh & Jason M. Williams, Low-Income Grandparents as the Newest
Draftees in the Government's War on Drugs: A Legal and RhetoricalAnalysis of Departmentof Housing
and Urban Development v. Rucker, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 157 (2003).
283. See Austin, supra note 195, at 278.
284. Id. at 280.
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of [their] household[s]. 2 85 PHAs and courts also impose a worldview of selfdetermination: that the head of household, grandmothers in particular, must
somehow foresee and forestall bad acts by refusing any and all suspicious guests
or family members from entering the premises.
In many circumstances, there is often a clear lack of knowledge that
grandmothers have of their grandchildren's criminal activity. Arguably, many
elderly heads of household express antipathy to drugs. But, the grandchildren
usually attempt to keep the proscribed illegal drug activity secret. 28 6 Further,
grandmothers in public housing have become romanticized as the bedrock of the
traditional black community and valorized for taking care of grandchildren,
which leaves the elderly with no choice but to risk caring for the kids in the face
2 7
of having no knowledge or a lack of knowledge of potential criminal activity. "
In other words, the One-Strike Rule requires mothers and grandmothers to live
according to a state-imposed, paternalistic rationality that subjugates maternal
senses of authority. The unusually harsh punitive measures imposed by the OneStrike Rule impacts women and children the most. Thus, scholars and
practitioners have for some time argued that the "inclusion in the law of a fault
requirement that takes into account [mothers'] best efforts to mitigate the harm to
their neighbors while trying to salvage their children's lives" is necessary to
ameliorate the debilitating hardships created by evictions. 2 The inclusion of a
fault requirement is a step in the right direction, but more substantive statutory
protections are necessary to fully equip tenants with the tools to fight unjust
evictions.
3. Rationalizing Trial Court Discretion over PHA Determinations
What makes the serious injustice exemption and the unconscionability rule
truly novel in the public housing context is that the statutes codify trial court
discretion to take into consideration not only mitigation efforts or innocence, but
a variety of other circumstances surrounding the incident of criminal activity and
the condition of the tenant at the time the incident occurred. This carefully
calibrated matrix of factors is what sets the statutes apart from the traditional
285. See United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
286. See Austin, supra note 195, at 282.
287. See Beverly Beyette, A Second Motherhood, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at El; Betty Booker,
Labor of Love: For lany Reasons, lore Grandparents Are Raising Their Children's Children,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, March 6, 1995, at El; Jane Gross, Grandmothers Bear a Burden Sired by
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1989, at Al; Dana Kennedy, Grandmothers Step in to Rear Children as
lothers Succumb to Crack, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, at A35; Douglas Martin, Now the Work That's
Never Done Is Grandmother's,N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991, §4, at 6; Michele Norris, Grandmothers Who
Fill Void Carved by Drugs; lany Rearing Offspring ofAddicted Children, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1991,
at Al; Tony Pugh, Black Grandmas Often the Glue Holding Families;Raising Children Takes Toll, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, June 2, 1996, at A14; Christopher Quinn, A Break in the Epidemic: As Use
of Crack Cocaine Drops, Social Workers, Judges. Doctors and Grandmothers of Crack Babies Continue
to Try to Help Its Young Victims, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 13, 1998, at IA.
288. See Austin, supra note 195, at 283.
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defenses employed for tenants in eviction proceedings. Thus, when faced with
evictions of subsidized tenants, who live disproportionately in households headed
by women with children, the judicial discretion authorized by the serious
injustice exemption and the unconscionability rule recognize that the needs and
vulnerabilities of those groups should be considered, irrespective of the strictliability policy permitted by the Court in Rucker. The value of this "new eviction
jurisprudence" is that it is a litigation road less traveled than the road so
frequently taken on mitigation and innocence.
One way to rationalize the importance of giving trial courts discretion in civil
proceedings to consider the extent of the criminal activity and the condition of

the tenant at the time of eviction, is to compare such discretion to criminal
sentencing guidelines and criminal proceedings. The comparison is apt. It

provides a different perspective on the necessity of trial court discretion over
matters where a person's property interests in subsidized housing, like a person's
liberty when facing imprisonment, is at stake.
The standard required in most criminal proceedings is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Pennsylvania law, for example, permits trial courts to deviate
from sentencing guidelines under the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code when
determining an offender's sentence.289 Sentencing judges may take into account
the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the
gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim
and the community, as long as the trial court also states on the record "the factual
basis and specific reasons which compelled him to deviate from the guideline

range. ,,290
Pennsylvania appellate courts, likewise, are guided by certain rules regarding
review of a criminal sentence. They may have regard for the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant
289. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West 2015).
290. See Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 206 (Pa.Super.2001) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Davis, 737 A.2d 792, 798 (Pa. Super. 1999)) (emphasis added). In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 666 A.2d
690, 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), the Court stated that the trial judge may deviate from the guidelines after
considering "the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the gravity of the
particular offense .. .so long as he also states of record the 'factual basis and specific reasons which
compelled him to deviate from the guideline range."' In 1974, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
passed the Code for trial judges to use in determining sentences. In 1978, the Pennsylvania Commission
on Sentencing was created to establish the Sentencing Guidelines, which trial courts were to follow.
Then, in 1982, the Assembly approved the Guidelines created by the Commission and later amended. See
Sentencing Guidelines, 204 Pa. Code § 303.1(c)(2) (2010). However, in Commonwealth v. Walls, 926
A.2d 957, 964-65 (Pa. 2007), the Court reaffirmed that the Guidelines were not binding and that they did
not predominate over other sentencing considerations. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721
(West 2015) states that "the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call
for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates
to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. The court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect under section 2155 ....In every case where
the court imposes a sentence or resentence outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing ...the court shall provide a contemporaneous written statement of the reason
or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines to the commission . ...
"
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when reviewing an appeal of a sentence. 291 This requirement is most vivid in
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a
challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence imposed within the statutory
limits. 29 2 The Court recognized that the guidelines were put in place to address

disparities in sentencing, that the guidelines are not mandatory and trial courts
"retain broad discretion in sentencing matters., 293 The Pennsylvania Superior
Court, likewise, has asserted in Commonwealth v. Minott that "[a]lthough the
sentencing guidelines specify definitive ranges of minimum sentences, the
294
adoption of the guidelines was not intended to preclude judicial discretion. ,
Thus, before overriding or refusing to review the decision of trial courts,
appellate courts must determine whether the sentence is so manifestly excessive
that it constitutes too severe a punishment.295
In Commonwealth v. Vanderhorst,the court found that "considering all of the
circumstances particular to this case ...

the lower court in Vanderhorst did not

abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonably lenient sentence. 296 The
Superior Court in Vanderhorst overturned the Commonwealth Court, which
previously had overruled the trial court's decision to deviate from the sentencing
guidelines by imposing a lenient sentence. The Superior Court found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it looked at the offender's past criminal
record in conjunction with the fact that he had a "good employment history and a
supportive family and that he had rehabilitated himself following his bout of
,,297
criminal activity during his late teens and early twenties.
Such considerations,
the Court noted, were specifically permitted by the Legislature.29
Whether it is an eviction for drug-related criminal activity or imprisonment
for drug-related offenses, authorizing trial court discretion and appellate
oversight of that discretion where necessary may go a long way to reducing
unnecessary material hardship and increased housing stability contributing to
concentrated urban poverty. The tenant in Somerville showed adequate
rehabilitation and had led a life of positive progress after enduring the
291. See 42

PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(d)(1) (West 2015) (emphasis added).
292. 812 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 2002). See also Commonwealth v. Frazier; 500 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985). Further, the sentencing guidelines are advisory only. See In re J.M.P., 863 A.2d 17, 19
n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) ("We recognize that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory and
sentencing judges may sentence outside of the guidelines if they deem it appropriate to do so and offer
good reasons."). In Commonwealth v. Chesson, 509 A.2d 875 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), the Court
emphasized the importance of the procedural aspects of the sentencing Code and guidelines, stating that
the "sentencing code, however, mandates that sentencing courts consider the guidelines before
sentencing. Manifestation of such consideration is statutorily required when the court deviates. And, of
course, the reasons for deviation must be 'adequate."' Id. at 876 77.
293. Id.
294. 395 Pa. Sup. Ct. 552, 558 (1990).
295. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 299 A.2d 640 (Pa. 1973); Commonwealth v. Wrona, 275 A.2d 78
(Pa. 1971); Commonwealth v. Marks, 275 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1971); Commonwealthv. Riggins, 232 A.2d 521
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 377 A.2d 140 (Pa. 1977).
296. 501 A.2d 262, 265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (emphasis added).
297. Id.
298. Id.

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

[Vol. XXIII

punishment of probation, court costs and other punitive measures resulting from
her conviction almost three years earlier. The discretion exercised by the
Somerville court-substituting its judgment, based on the facts, for the PHA'sresulted in a decision that helped forestall the prospect of yet another young
mother and child being rendered homeless.
4. Avoiding the Fallout Effects of Eviction
The definitions of "serious injustice" and "unconscionable" are perhaps the
most complicated aspects of the statutes. Where a PHA has ignored or refused to
consider certain facts of the case that would lead a reasonable person to a
different conclusion, the trial court should be authorized to supplement its
judgment in place of the PHA's to safeguard against a serious injustice or
unconscionable result. A new eviction jurisprudence would amalgamate serious
injustice and unconscionable consequence to mean an event or an act that causes
profoundly unjust treatment that is likely to expose the defendant (tenant) to a
heightened degree of danger if the event or act (eviction) is commenced. Indeed,
this requires a heightened standard of review.
As Desmond's research shows, an eviction that causes unconscionable
results is one where homelessness looms, contributing to higher rates of
adolescent violence, material hardship, poor school performance, mental health
problems, victimization, respiratory disease, and delayed literacy in children.299
An eviction that results in a serious injustice occurs when a poor tenant is subject
to having an eviction on her record due to circumstances she could not have
controlled, foreseen or prevented. A serious injustice is falling further to the
bottom of the rental market and resorting to dilapidated and uninhabitable shelter
upon eviction. A serious injustice of unconscionable proportions is the specter of
prolonged periods of homelessness that results in a vicious cycle of street and
sheltered homelessness.
Indeed, a carefully calibrated consideration of a matrix of factors under the
unconscionability rule and serious injustice exemption is essential for PHAs and
courts to follow when deciding the fate of a tenant. Courts cannot, and are not
required to, sit back as mere observers of the One-Strike Rule and permit PHAs
to exercise abusive discretion over who stays and who goes from public housing
or Section 8 housing. Such passiveness, without due regard for the welfare of
those affected by the eviction, would be contrary to the basic values of human
dignity.
Over 15 years after the Rucker decision was handed down by the United
States Supreme Court, it is interesting to see how the "absurdity" discussion
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court has now been resurrected,
particularly in the Lofton case. The Eastern Carolina Regional Housing

299. See supra Part I.
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Authority's conviction that a statute requiring a landlord to prove a negative300 that the eviction would not be unconscionable-would create "absurd"
consequences is precisely the opposite conclusion that the Ninth Circuit found by
permitting a strict-liability One-Strike policy. A counterfactual helps understand
why the housing authority is probably on the losing end of this battle.
If it would be absurd to evict a single mother with three young children
whose boyfriend was a last resort babysitter simply because the tenant permitted
her boyfriend into the apartment, unaware of his drug activity, then it surely
would not be absurd to require the landlord to show affirmatively that the
removal of the tenant would not create unconscionable consequences. If
anything, the additional burden imposed on the landlord evens the playing field
for tenants. Critics of the unconscionability rule run the risk of basing
counterarguments on weak conceptual foundations of fundamental fairness.
The counterargument-that the rule will give rise to tenants invoking the
unconscionability prong for non-payment of rent evictions or any other default
by which the landowner becomes financially insolvent-is probably the most
absurd of conclusions. The tenant who is unable, or unwilling, to pay rent; or the
tenant who knowingly permits a drunk guest to enter the premises who
subsequently damages property; or the tenant who, as a last resort, pleads
homelessness just to forestall proceedings will likely be given curt treatment by
the trial courts. The very design of the serious injustice exemption and the
unconscionability rule guide trial courts to assertively ascertain the facts to make
a reasonable determination.
The language of the statutes also goes a long way in rationalizing
fundamental concepts of fairness, particularly where sympathy for a victim is
naturally of concern in the decision-making process. PHAs and pro-tenant
advocates are guilty of the "sympathy ploy." Those in opposition to courts
substituting judicial discretion over administrative discretion often invoke
sympathy, or at least acknowledge as much, as a tactic to tacitly veer courts away
from considering factors that require subjective reasoning. Moreover, they may
argue that this subjective reasoning will invariably have discriminatory effects.
For example, PHAs often acknowledge, and agree, that subsidized tenants
facing eviction, such as Somerville or Lofton, are sympathetic due to their
personal and financial situations, but when it comes to evicting for drug-related
criminal activity, even if innocent or rehabilitated, the PHA argues that its hands
are tied by federal regulations enacted to ease enforcement difficulties. 30 1 This is
a clever tactic because it creates a perception-one that judges often want to
avoid-of patience, sympathy, and empathy. Tenant advocates employ notions of
sympathy for a different reason: to keep the tenant in the apartment and offer a
more humane resolution. This also has its drawbacks. It is of no use to the tenant
300. See Clark v. Western North Carolina R. Co., 360 N.C. 109, 111 (1863) ("They are put by the
law under the heavy burden of proving affirmatively, a negative.") (emphasis added).
301. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002).
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in subsidized evictions, or when facing a One-Strike eviction, to create a
perception that denying the eviction is tantamount to a "plea for charity rather
than an assertion of rights. 30 2 Such a perception, arguably, does more harm than
good even when pro-tenant litigants employ these litigation tactics.
With the advent of the serious injustice exemption and unconscionability
rule, the statutes help guide courts in substantive and procedural principles of law
and equity, not patience and empathy. For example, both the serious injustice
exemption and the unconscionability rule require a landlord, to some extent, to
prove a negative-to show that eviction would not lead to unconscionable results
or serious injustices. Of course, such a requirement is a heavy burden for
landlords. However, when the issue facing the court is the loss of constitutional
protections of property afforded to some of the nation's poorest populationssubsidized households headed by poor women with children-such heightened
burdens of proof are necessary.
This "new eviction jurisprudence" balances the rights of the tenant, who
undeniably hold property interests in a subsidized unit, with the property rights of
the PHA and its responsibility to protect the health and safety of the other
residents. It is a balancing act, indeed, but a balance that is necessary, because
one party to a proceeding is a subsidized tenant who inevitably faces some form
of homelessness-sheltered or street-upon eviction. Thus, the right of a poor
tenant to continue to live in subsidized housing and the protections that give
effect to that right under the serious injustice exemption and the
unconscionability rule are important for the constitutional protections afforded to
property interests held by those most vulnerable to the One-Strike Rule.
CONCLUSION

Providing courts with more discretion to deny an eviction by way of statutory
exemptions and rules is an important step toward fully embracing the notion that
the plight of the urban poor is malleable, not static. A One-Strike eviction should
not be viewed as black and white and inflexible when analyzed by state courts.
Indeed, the statutory provisions discussed in this Article are novelties in the postRucker era and ensure that the opportunity for the poor and vulnerable to be
heard is tailored to the capacities and circumstances of their lives. The
unconscionability rule creates new avenues for substantively protecting the
property interests of subsidized tenants who are innocent and who endure other
factors and conditions that make eviction unreasonable. State courts should
follow the examples of the Somerville and Lofton rulings, which give trial courts
wide-ranging discretion to overrule an administrative agency's decision to evict
if the eviction is unjust or unfair.
302. Smart Wilson, Breaking the Tie: Evictions from Private Land, Homelessness and A New
Normality, 126 S. AFRICAN L.J. 270, 282 (2009).
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There are several other alternatives to advance this "new eviction
jurisprudence," all of which are beyond the scope of this Article and would
require further investigation into both the regulatory and administrative
requirements to change the normal state of affairs. One option is for HUD to
amend its regulations to include some rendition of the serious injustice
exemption and unconscionability rule under 42 U.S.C. § 1437. This may ease the
contentious preemption debates rumbling today in state courts throughout the
country regarding the One-Strike Rule. Further, such an amendment would
essentially remove the One-Strike Rule and serve as one more step toward
dismantling the failed policies of the War on Drugs. State legislatures elsewhere
could also amend and/or enact new legislation giving effect to the serious
injustice exemption and unconscionability rule. A normative interpretation of the
Pennsylvania and North Carolina statutes serve as the foundation for a "new
eviction jurisprudence" that gives special consideration to the constitutional
protections of property afforded to groups most vulnerable to the One-Strike
Rule: households headed by poor women with children.

